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Older adults demonstrate spared metacognitive monitoring abilities, despite 
cognitive decline in other domains. An extensive literature examines how accurately 
individuals engage in monitoring. The question of how often individuals engage in 
metacognition has been neglected. It is also possible that individuals who monitor more 
often also monitor more accurately, and age-related increases in monitoring contributes 
to older adults’ intact monitoring abilities. In the current study, younger and older adults 
were assigned to one of two conditions. Control condition participants completed a 
learning task containing thought content probes. Experimental condition participants 
completed the same learning task containing both thought content probes and screens 
asking them to make judgments of learning (JOLs). This design allows us to compare 
monitoring frequency in younger and older adults, determine how making explicit 
metacognitive judgments alters propensity to engage in monitoring, and examine the 
relationship between monitoring frequency and monitoring accuracy within the 
experimental condition. Older adults engaged in more frequent monitoring than younger 
adults. Additionally, older adults who were required to provide JOLs engaged in more 
frequent monitoring than older adults who were not required to make JOLs. Finally, 
younger and older adults who engaged in more frequent monitoring were not found to 
have more accurate metacognitive judgments than those who engaged in less frequent 
monitoring.
 
 
    
HOW OFTEN DO YOUNGER AND OLDER ADULTS ENGAGE IN MONITORING? 
A NEW APPROACH TO STUDYING METACOGNITION 
 
 
by 
 
 
Megan J. Jordano 
 
A Dissertation Submitted to 
the Faculty of The Graduate School at 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
Greensboro 
2018 
 
 
 
    Approved by 
 
  Dayna R. Touron                                                                         
   Committee Chair
ii 
APPROVAL PAGE 
 
 
This dissertation, written by Megan J. Jordano has been approved by the 
following committee of the Faculty of The Graduate School at The University of North 
Carolina at Greensboro. 
 
    Committee Chair Dr. Dayna R. Touron                                           
          Committee Members Dr. Michael J. Kane 
Dr. Ethan Zell      
Dr. Christopher Wahlheim  
 
 
           
                                                                                                                                     
                          
03/20/18_____________________  
Date of Acceptance by Committee 
03/5/18___________________  
Date of Final Oral Examination            
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. vi 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... vii 
CHAPTER 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................1 
Measuring Monitoring Accuracy .................................................................3 
Monitoring Accuracy and Aging .................................................................5 
Metacognitive Control Across Adulthood ...................................................7 
Mind-Wandering and Spontaneous Metacognitive Monitoring ..................8 
Other Types of Spontaneous Thoughts  .....................................................11 
Measuring Monitoring Frequency  ............................................................12 
Mind-Wandering Thought Probe Methodology ........................................14 
Research Aims ...........................................................................................17 
 
 II. YOUNGER ADULT STUDY 1 METHODS ......................................................20 
Participants .................................................................................................20 
Materials and Procedure ............................................................................20 
 
        III. YOUNGER ADULT STUDY 2 METHODS ......................................................23 
Participants .................................................................................................23 
Materials and Procedure ............................................................................24 
 
        IV. YOUNGER ADULT STUDIES RESULT AND DISCUSSION .......................26 
         V. OLDER ADULT STUDY 1 METHODS ............................................................32 
Participants .................................................................................................32 
Materials and Procedure ............................................................................33 
 
        VI. OLDER ADULT STUDY 2 METHODS ............................................................34 
Participants .................................................................................................34 
Materials and Procedure ............................................................................34 
 
 
iv 
 VII. OLDER ADULT STUDIES RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ............................35 
 
 VIII. STUDY 5 METHODS .........................................................................................40 
 
Participants .................................................................................................41 
Materials ....................................................................................................42 
Paired associates learning task .......................................................42 
Paired associates cued recall task ..................................................45 
Scoring ...........................................................................................45 
Paired associates strategy reports...................................................45 
Post-task measures .........................................................................46 
Procedures ..................................................................................................46 
 
 IX. STUDY 5 RESULTS ...........................................................................................48 
Task-Related Interference ..........................................................................49 
                        Content of TRI ...........................................................................................52 
Recall Performance ....................................................................................59 
JOLs ...........................................................................................................62 
Strategy Use ...............................................................................................71 
Post-Task Questionnaires...........................................................................72 
 
 X. STUDY 5 DISCUSSION .....................................................................................76 
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................85 
 
FOOTNOTES ..................................................................................................................101 
APPENDIX A. DSSQ (THOUGHT CONTENT) ...........................................................102 
APPENDIX B. DSSQ (MOTIVATION) .........................................................................103 
APPENDIX C. STUDIES 1-5 POST-TASK QUESTIONS............................................104 
APPENDIX D. PTQ DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STUDY 1 ............................107 
APPENDIX E. PTQ DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STUDY 2 .............................108 
APPENDIX F. PTQ DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STUDY 3 .............................109 
APPENDIX G. DEMOGRAPHICS AND HEALTH QUESTIONNAIRE ....................110 
APPENDIX H. LIGHTHOUSE NEAR VISUAL AQUITY ...........................................118 
 
v 
APPENDIX I. ADVANCED VOCABULARY TEST I-V4 ...........................................119 
 
APPENDIX J. PROCESSING SPEED TASK ................................................................121 
APPENDIX K. EXAMPLE STIMULI FOR PAIRED ASSOCIATES  
       TASK ................................................................................................124  
 
APPENDIX L. STUDY 5 POST-TASK QUESTIONS ..................................................125 
 
APPENDIX M. COGNITIVE FAILURES QUESTIONNAIRE ....................................126 
 
APPENDIX N. MEASURE OF DAILY MEMORY  
       MONITORING .................................................................................129 
 
APPENDIX O. STUDIES 1-4 TRI DATA......................................................................130 
 
APPENDIX P. STUDIES 1-4 APPROACH-BASED TRI DATA .................................131 
 
APPENDIX Q. STUDIES 1-4 EVALUATIVE TRI DATA ...........................................132 
APPENDIX R. STUDY 5 DESCRIPTIVES BY AGE, CONDITION,   
       AND BLOCK ...................................................................................133 
        
APPENDIX S. STUDY 5 DESCRIPTIVES BY AGE, CONDITION,   
       AND RELATEDNESS .....................................................................134 
                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
   LIST OF TABLES 
  Page 
Table 1. Monitoring Indices Descriptive Statistics ............................................................65 
Table 2. Overall Correlations Between Monitoring Indices, TRI, 
                   PA Recall, and PA Strategy Use .....................................................................68 
Table 3. Correlations Between Monitoring Indices, TRI, 
                   PA Recall, and PA Strategy Use for YAs .......................................................69 
Table 4. Correlations Between Monitoring Indices, TRI, 
                   PA Recall, and PA Strategy Use for OAs .......................................................70 
Table 5. Post-Task Questionnaire Data .............................................................................75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
  Page 
Figure 1. Thought Probe Levels Used in Study 2 and Study 4. .........................................25 
 
Figure 2. TRI for Studies 1-2. ............................................................................................27 
 
Figure 3. Approach-Based TRI for Studies 1-2 .................................................................28 
 
Figure 4. Evaluative TRI for Studies 1-2 ...........................................................................30 
 
Figure 5. TRI for Studies 3-4. ............................................................................................36 
 
Figure 6. Approach-Based TRI for Studies 3-4 .................................................................37 
 
Figure 7. Evaluative TRI for Studies 3-4 ...........................................................................38 
 
Figure 8. Layout of Study 5 ...............................................................................................47 
 
Figure 9. TRI for Study 5. ..................................................................................................53 
 
Figure 10. Approach-Based TRI for Study 5 .....................................................................55 
 
Figure 11. Evaluative TRI for Study 5...............................................................................57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are attending a lecture. It is important to you that you pay close 
attention to the information the speaker is conveying and that you can later recall this 
information. As you listen, you find yourself engaging in extraneous thoughts. You might 
realize you are getting distracted by noises in your environment and that you need to 
refocus your attention. Or perhaps you periodically summarize or repeat to yourself what 
the speaker had just said. If you find your comprehension lacking, you may determine 
that you should ask the speaker to repeat or explain a critical piece of information. These 
are just some examples of metacognition, or thoughts one has regarding their own 
cognitive processes (Flavell, 1979). 
Three distinct yet interrelated aspects of metacognition include knowledge, 
control, and monitoring. Metacognitive knowledge refers to a person’s understanding and 
beliefs about cognition. Metacognitive control refers to regulating one’s ongoing 
cognitive activities.  Metacognitive monitoring refers to various thoughts people have 
regarding their ongoing task performance or progress. Metacognitive thoughts about 
one’s task knowledge, performance, and approach are expected to occur with varying 
frequency in everyday life, but the question of how frequently individuals engage in 
metacognitive thoughts has been neglected within the study of metacognition.  
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An extensive literature has examined metacognitive monitoring, generally 
focusing on whether individuals’ judgments about their task performance accurately   
reflect how well they are performing a task of interest, and which factors predict or 
influence the accuracy of one’s performance-related thoughts. For instance, a PsychInfo 
search including the terms “metacognition” and “monitoring” results in well over a 
thousand separate sources. The question of how frequently individuals spontaneously 
monitor their task performance is an also critical but thus far neglected research question. 
It is possible that the degree to which one spontaneously reflects on their task 
performance influences the accuracy of those thoughts and, ultimately, performance on 
the associated cognitive task.  
The question of age-related patterns in spontaneous thoughts about task 
performance is of particular interest. Older adults’ metacognitive monitoring abilities 
remain relatively spared despite declines in other types of cognitive functioning (Shaw & 
Craik, 1989; Salthouse, 1991; Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999; Dunlosky & Connor, 1997) 
but no work within the metacognition literature has examined the specific frequency and 
content of monitoring experiences in younger and older adults. We argue that age-related 
patterns in the frequency or content of spontaneous metacognitive thoughts may 
influence age-related patterns in monitoring accuracy and task performance. 
In discussing the importance of studying the frequency of individuals’ thoughts 
regarding task performance, we begin with a brief overview of metacognitive monitoring, 
including discussion of age-related patterns in monitoring. Following this review of the 
monitoring literature, a potential method from the mind-wandering literature that can be 
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used to measure the frequency of spontaneous metacognitive thoughts is discussed, as 
well as findings from the mind-wandering literature that may provide an indication of 
how frequently individuals think about their task performance. Finally, we describe and 
discuss the results of a study designed to examine the frequency of spontaneous 
metacognitive monitoring in younger and older adults, the effect of making 
metacognitive judgements on the frequency and content of mind-wandering, and the 
relationship between spontaneous metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive 
monitoring accuracy. This study hopefully provides a starting point for future studies 
examining monitoring frequency and factors that influence how often individuals engage 
in monitoring.  
Measuring Monitoring Accuracy   
The relationships between cognition and different types of metacognitive thoughts 
can be understood by examining popular models of metacognition, such as the Nelson 
and Narens model (1990) and the COPES model of self-regulated learning (Winne & 
Hadwin, 1998). These models include an interplay between one’s ability to use 
metacognitive monitoring to evaluate task performance and one’s ability to use the results 
of that monitoring to alter task approach and thus improve task performance. Although 
these models assume that people reflect on their task performance spontaneously, few 
studies address the question of how often individuals spontaneously engage in 
metacognitive thoughts, or how frequently people engage in metacognitive thoughts that 
are unprompted by task instructions that specifically ask them to reflect on their task 
performance. 
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Determining the accuracy of peoples’ insights regarding their memory processes 
involves comparing ones’ performance judgments to their actual task memory 
performance. Monitoring accuracy is a topic of great interest because accurate monitoring 
should lead to more updating of one’s task representations, more effective regulation of 
task activities and, ultimately, improved task performance.  Monitoring and control 
processes are believed to operate in a feedback loop (‘monitoring affects control 
hypothesis’; Nelson & Leonesio, 1988). If peoples’ thoughts regarding their task 
performance are accurate then effective strategies can be chosen to complete the task and 
performance improved. Individuals with better memory performance (Maki & Berry, 
1984) and study strategies (Connor, Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 1997) have been shown to 
have better monitoring accuracy.  
Examples of metacognitive judgments include judgments of learning (JOLs; 
Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969), feeling of knowing judgments (FOKs; Hart, 1965), and 
confidence judgments (CJs). JOLs are made during encoding after one has acquired new 
information but before that information has been tested. JOLs tap into individuals’ 
thoughts about how well they have learned an item (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969). FOKs are 
made during retention or retrieval of information and are judgments regarding the 
likelihood of recognizing currently unrecallable answers on a later test (Hart, 1965; 
Nelson, Leonesio, Shimamura, Landwehr, & Narens, 1982). CJs are made after a 
participant has retrieved an answer during test and reflect participants’ thoughts about 
how well they were able to recall information from memory.  
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In metacognition studies, participants are often asked to make their metacognitive 
judgments during learning and memory tasks such as the paired associates task (Arbuckle 
& Cuddy, 1969; Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; Dunlosky & 
Nelson, 1994), in which participants study pairs of words in anticipation of a later 
memory test. The accuracy of performance monitoring can be measured in terms of 
relative accuracy or absolute accuracy. Relative accuracy is typically measured using 
discrimination indices such as gamma correlations (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954; Nelson, 
1984), which assess the degree to which a person’s performance judgments distinguish 
between correctly versus incorrectly recalled items. Absolute accuracy is the degree to 
which one’s level of judgments matches one’s actual level of performance (Maki, 
Shields, Wheeler, & Zacchilli, 2005), and, unlike gamma correlations, typically account 
for judgment bias. Measures include difference scores and calibration curves.   
Monitoring Accuracy and Aging  
Normal cognitive aging is characterized by declines in a wide variety of cognitive 
tasks. Older adults often have poorer performance on memory tasks compared to younger 
adults (Lovelace & Marsh, 1985; Rabinowitz, Ackerman, Craik, & Hinchley, 1982; Shaw 
& Craik, 1989) and also report more memory-related complaints than do younger adults 
(Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000; Levy-Cushman & Abeles, 1998). Cognitive aging is also 
characterized by declines in processing speed (Salthouse, 1991), executive control 
(Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999; McDowd & Craik, 1988), and rate of learning (Dunlosky 
& Connor, 1997).  Given these age-related cognitive declines, one might expect that older 
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adults would also suffer relative to younger adults in monitoring ability. However, most 
evidence suggests age invariance in monitoring accuracy.  
Younger adults have above-chance relative JOL accuracy (Hertzog, Kidder, 
Powell, Moman, & Dunlosky, 2002; Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; Robinson, Hertzog, & 
Dunlosky, 2006), and older adults have similar or higher relative JOL accuracy (Connor, 
Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 1997; Halamish, McGillivray, & Castel, 2011; Hertzog, Dixon, & 
Hultsch, 1990; Hertzog, Kidder, Powell, Moman, & Dunlosky, 2002; Hertzog, Saylor, 
Fleece, & Dixon, 1994; Robinson, Hertzog, & Dunlosky, 2006; Lovelace & Marsh, 1985; 
Shaw & Craik, 1989). Absolute JOL accuracy may also be equivalent in younger and 
older adults (McDonald-Miszczak, Hunter, & Hultsch, 1994).  
While there is evidence of age equivalence in monitoring, studies have found age-
related deficits in related abilities (Bruce, Coyne, & Botwinick, 1982; Devolder, 
Brigham, & Pressley, 1990; Lovelace, 1990). Older adults struggle with aggregating 
metacognitive information, resulting in monitoring deficits when making global 
predictions of performance (Brigham & Pressley, 1988; Hertzog et al., 
2008; Hertzog, Touron, & Hines, 2007). However, older adults are typically as accurate 
as younger adults when asked to make item-by-item JOLs (Baker, Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 
2010; Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick, & Sanvito, 1989; Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011; 
Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000; Hertzog, Kiddler, Powell-Momon, & Dunlosky, 2002; 
Hertzog, Sinclair, & Dunlosky, 2010). As with JOLs, younger adults’ FOKs are 
moderately correlated with task performance (Hart, 1967; Nelson, Leonesio, Shimamura, 
Landwehr, & Narens, 1982). Absolute accuracy for FOK judgments about general 
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knowledge also shows age invariance (Butterfield, Nelson, & Peck, 1988; Eakin, 
Hertzog, & Harris, 2014; Souchay, Moulin, Clarys, Taconnat, & Isingrini, 2007). Even in 
tasks where older adults have worse memory performance, they have FOK resolution 
similar to younger adults’ (Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011; Hertzog, Dunlosky, & Sinclair, 
2010).  
Findings on age-related differences in the accuracy of CJs have been mixed; some 
work suggests that younger and older adults are equally good at making post-dictions 
regarding memory performance (Hertzog, Saylor, Fleece, & Dixon, 1994) whereas other 
studies suggest that older adults are more likely than younger adults to produce high-
confidence false alarms (e.g., Dodson, Bawa, & Krueger, 2007). Additionally, older 
adults sometimes show poorer resolution in CJs when incorrect lures are present (e.g., 
Kelley & Sahakyan, 2003), indicating that older adults may poorly encode information 
(Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011).  
Metacognitive Control Across Adulthood 
The accuracy of individuals’ monitoring processes is a topic of interest in part 
because accurate evaluations regarding task performance often result in more effective 
cognitive control. Metacognitive judgements such as JOLs correlate with allocation of 
self-based study time (Nelson & Leonesio, 1988; Connor, Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 1997), 
other strategic choices (for a review, see Dunlosky, Hertzog, Kennedy, & Thiede, 2005), 
and future recall performance (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969). Although younger and older 
adults seem to think about their task performance in similar ways, there is evidence that, 
despite age-invariance in metacognitive monitoring, younger and older adults do not 
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implement metacognitive control in similar ways (Pansky, Goldsmith, Koriat, & 
Pearlman-Avnion, 2009; Souchay & Isingrini, 2012; Kuhlmann & Touron, 2011). Older 
adults report using fewer encoding strategies than younger adults (Loewen, Shaw, & 
Craik, 1990) and are also less effective than younger adults at monitoring the 
effectiveness of different learning strategies (Brigham & Pressley, 1988; Pressley, Levin, 
& Ghatala, 1984), even though they do not seem to have issues in monitoring the 
products of their memory processes. Age differences in strategy choice and strategy 
monitoring may contribute to age differences in later memory performance, even if 
performance monitoring itself is spared.    
Mind-Wandering and Spontaneous Metacognitive Monitoring 
Particularly relevant to the question of how often individuals spontaneous monitor 
their task performance is the literature examining intrusive, off-task thoughts that are 
task-related. Because TRI encompasses thoughts regarding task performance, TRI may 
be analogous to metacognitive monitoring. Given this, patterns of TRI may provide 
insight regarding how frequently individuals spontaneously monitor their task 
performance. Numerous factors have been found to influence the amount of TRI 
(metacognitive monitoring; McVay et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2009; Frank et al., 
2015; Jordano & Touron, 2017a), that is experienced during a cognitive task. For 
example, task difficulty is associated with propensity to engage in mind-wandering, with 
younger (McVay et al., 2013) and older (Zavagnin et al., 2014) adults reporting more TRI 
on difficult tasks relative to easier ones. The results of these studies both suggest 
individuals engage in more metacognitive monitoring when the ongoing task is difficult.  
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Importantly, age has been found to influence both the amount of probe-caught 
mind-wandering and the content of mind-wandering experiences. It has been found 
across various types of cognitive tasks and using both retrospective thought content 
questionnaires and thought-probes that older adults report less overall mind-wandering 
than do younger adults (Giambra, 1989; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Krawietz, Tamplin, & 
Radvansky, 2012; McVay, Meier, Touron, & Kane, 2013; Frank et al., 2015; Jordano & 
Touron, 2017a), despite age-related declines in working memory capacity and inhibitory 
processes (Hasher & Zacks, 1988).  While they report fewer off-task thoughts about 
things completely unrelated to the task (task-unrelated thoughts; TUTs) compared to 
younger adults, older adults do report more TRI than younger adults do (McVay et al., 
2013; Zavagnin, Borella, & De Beni, 2014; Frank et al., 2015; Jordano & Touron, 
2017a). McVay and colleagues (2013) found that TRI accounted for some of the age-
related differences in overall reported mind-wandering during a sustained attention task, 
but older adults still reported less overall mind-wandering than younger adults. In other 
words, although older adults report fewer off-task thoughts than younger adults, they 
have been found to report more thinking about task performance and thus more 
metacognitive monitoring. Numerous other studies using a variety of different cognitive 
tasks demonstrate that older adults report less overall mind-wandering than do younger 
adults (Giambra, 1989; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Krawietz, Tamplin, & Radvansky, 2012; 
Frank et al., 2015; Jordano & Touron, 2017a). Factors such as more performance-related 
current concerns being primed by the testing environment (Mrazek et al., 2011; Jordano 
& Touron, 2017a; Jordano & Touron, 2017b) and one’s beliefs regarding their ability to 
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control their cognitive functions (Lachman & Agrigoroaei, 2012) have been found to 
influence TRI, and may explain older adults’ increased TRI relative to younger adults in 
laboratory settings.  
While some studies include TRI as a response option, the exact content of 
individuals’ TRI experiences remains unknown. While we believe that TRI includes 
performance monitoring (metacognitive monitoring) it is also possible that individuals 
also think about implementing different task strategies to improve performance 
(metacognitive control). More work should be done examining the specific content of 
TRI experiences and the frequency in which individuals spontaneously engage in 
different types of TRI. Additionally, more work should be conducted to examine how to 
the frequency and specific content of younger and older adults’ TRI experiences differ 
according to the type of cognitive task being completed.  
Although both TUTs and TRI are associated with in-the-moment performance 
errors (McVay & Kane, 2009; McVay et al., 2013), it is possible that engaging in TRI 
can benefit task performance. Again, task-related interference may be analogous to 
metacognitive monitoring, and successfully monitoring performance can lead to better 
metacognitive control and improved task performance. Whereas some studies have found 
that TRI is associated with worse task performance (Coy, O’Brien, Tabaczynski, 
Northern, & Carels, 2011; Smallwood et al., 2004; Smallwood et al., 2006; Smallwood et 
al., 2009; Jordano & Touron, 2017a), other studies have found that TRI is associated with 
better task performance (McVay & Kane, 2012) or is not associated with task 
performance (Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011).  The 
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relationship between TRI and task performance is normally studied by examining the 
effect that TRI has on in-the-moment performance or performance for shorter tasks. 
While TRI may disrupt in-the-moment performance, it is unclear if there are downstream 
benefits to engaging in TRI that are observable only when using more complex tasks with 
more potential to strategize. Additional work can be conducted to examine if and when 
TRI can be beneficial to task performance. 
Other Types of Spontaneous Thought 
In addition to mind-wandering, other types of spontaneous cognition have been 
investigated, including involuntary autobiographical memories (Bernsten, 2009), 
“earworms” or spontaneous reoccurring tunes (Beaman & Williams, 2010), prospective 
memory (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000), and involuntary semantic memories 
(Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004). Interest in spontaneous cognition has increased in 
recent years (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010, Christoff et al., 2011; O’Callaghan, Shine, 
Lewis, Andrews-Hanna, & Irish, 2015; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015) and the growing  
mind-wandering literature has led to increased interest in spontaneous cognition within 
older adults.  
Most cognitive aging research has focused on deliberately engaged cognition. 
However, thoughts may arise spontaneously in the absence of specific task demands or 
instructions meant to encourage participants to engage in those thought processes. 
Although there is little research examining spontaneous metacognitive thoughts across 
the adult life span, there are some studies examining involuntary autobiographical 
memories, intrusive thoughts, and spontaneous prospective memory. This extant 
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literature on aging and spontaneous cognition can provide some insight into whether one 
might expect age-related changes in spontaneous thoughts regarding task performance. 
As a whole, work on mind-wandering, involuntary autobiographical memories 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2002; Moulin et al., 2014; Rubin & Berntsen, 2009), intrusive 
thoughts (Beadel et al., 2013; Lambert et al., 2013; Magee & Teachman, 2012), and 
prospective memory within the lab and naturalistic settings (Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 
2007; Mullet et al., 2013; Scullin et al., 2011; but see Crovitz & Daniel, 1984) suggest 
that healthy older adults experience fewer spontaneous thoughts than do younger adults. 
These findings are more consistent with the theories of aging that suggest that older 
adults have a reduction in cognitive resources that result in them engaging is less self-
initiated thinking (Craik, 1983; Craik & Byrd, 1982). Given these findings, it is possible 
that older adults experience less spontaneous metacognition. However, no work within 
the metacognition literature has specifically examined spontaneous metacognitive 
thoughts regarding task performance, and the findings demonstrating increased TRI in 
older adults instead suggest that spontaneous performance monitoring increases with age.  
Measuring Monitoring Frequency 
Studying the accuracy of metacognitive thoughts requires participants to make 
explicit predictions or judgments about their cognitive abilities. While it is likely that 
participants think about their performance spontaneously and without being prompted to 
by the experimenter or task instructions, it is also possible that people taking part in 
metacognition studies engage in monitoring to a lesser or greater degree because they are 
explicitly being asked by the experimenters to make performance judgments. There has 
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been little consensus in regard to the direction of this effect with some studies finding 
that requiring participants to make metacognitive judgements results in increased task 
performance and other studies finding that requiring participants to make metacognitive 
judgements results in decreased task performance (see Double, Birney, & Walker, 2017 
for a recent review and meta-analysis of the literature examining reactivity associated 
with making metacognitive judgements). Sub-group analysis has shown that when paired 
associates task word pairs consist of unrelated pairs or lists comprised of a mixture of 
related and unrelated pairs no reactivity is found in terms of impact on memory 
performance (Double, Birney, & Walker, 2017). In contrast, when tasks consist 
exclusively of related pairs there is moderate positive reactivity observed. Evidence 
indicates that older adults’ learning from text is reduced by making metacognitive 
judgments (Stine-Morrow, Shake, Miles, & Noh, 2006).  
Past studies examining reactivity associated with having participants make 
metacognitive judgements have focused on the effect of making judgements on task 
performance. However, it is possible that making judgements may alter frequency and 
content of metacognitive thinking without necessarily altering task performance. 
Additional studies are needed that examine the effect of requiring participants to make 
explicit metacognitive judgements on both task performance and participants’ underlying 
thought patterns.  
This type of reactivity could be problematic when the purpose of metacognition 
studies is to examine the correspondence between metacognitive judgments and behavior, 
as in studies that examine the relationship between metacognitive monitoring and self-
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regulation of study (e.g. Dunlosky & Connor, 1997; Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1997; Metcalfe 
& Finn, 2008). If requiring participants to make explicit judgments about task 
performance results in increased monitoring and, as a result, altered task performance, 
then it is difficult to know how generalizable the findings of metacognition studies are 
beyond the specific experimental setting.  
The mind-wandering literature may provide a method for studying metacognitive 
monitoring, particularly the frequency of monitoring, in a less obtrusive way. As 
mentioned, research on mind-wandering often focuses on the content and nature of 
individuals’ spontaneous thoughts. As such, methodological tools used to study mind-
wandering may provide a tool for measuring spontaneous metacognitive thoughts without 
having participants make explicit performance judgments. While past studies of mind-
wandering have relied on retrospective thought content questionnaires to assess 
individuals’ self-generated intrusive thoughts while they complete cognitive tasks, many 
current studies instead rely on online thought probes to capture and measure mind-
wandering experiences. Online thought probes may also be useful in identifying instances 
of spontaneous metacognitive monitoring. 
Mind-Wandering Thought Probe Methodology 
Mind-wandering if often assessed using online thought content probes that are 
embedded within a cognitive task of interest, often working memory span tasks or 
sustained attention tasks. Probes can vary in the types of questions they include, but often 
ask participants to classify the type of thought they experienced immediately prior to the 
appearance of the probe. Thought probes are typically positioned approximately two to 
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three minutes apart in order to allow the mind to begin wandering across task trials. An 
example of a typical thought probe appears below. Participants are asked “What were you 
just thinking about?” and respond by selecting one of the following options listed using 
their computer keyboard:  
(1) The task: Focused on completing the task, verifying equations and 
remembering letters 
(2)  Task experience/performance: Evaluating one’s performance 
 (3)  Everyday things: Thinking about recent or impending life events 
(4)  Current state of being: Thinking about conditions such as hunger or sleepiness 
(5)  Personal worries: Thinking about concerns, troubles or fear not relating to the 
experimental task 
(6)  Daydreams: Fantasies disconnected from reality 
(7)  Other  
 The response options provided in the online probe correspond to different types 
of thoughts the participants may have been experiencing during the task. Option (1) 
corresponds to being completely on-task and thinking only about responding 
appropriately to the task stimuli, option (2) corresponds to thoughts regarding task 
performance (task-related interference; TRI), and options (3) through (7) correspond to 
thoughts that are completely unrelated to the cognitive task at hand. Several online 
thought probes are embedded throughout an experimental task, and participants’ 
responses are used to obtain mean proportions of on-task thoughts, thoughts about things 
unrelated to the task, and thoughts about task performance or strategy. 
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Using online thought probes to capture different types of thoughts during a 
cognitive task is an approach used within the mind-wandering literature to measure the 
frequency of internally generated off-task thoughts individuals experience (i.e., mind-
wandering) but it is also possible that this thought probe methodology can be used to 
measure the frequency of peoples’ spontaneous metacognitive thoughts. Again, what is 
known as task-related interference within the mind-wandering literature involves off-task 
thoughts regarding one’s task performance. This is likely to be analogous to 
metacognitive monitoring. Thought probes such as the one shown above provide a way 
for participants to indicate the amount of task-related interference or metacognitive 
monitoring they experience during a task.  
Asking participants to make explicit metacognitive performance judgments may 
change the extent to which individuals engage in thoughts about their task performance. 
If making the typical, explicit metacognitive judgments such as JOLs and FOK 
judgments alters the frequency of thoughts about task performance, then different 
methods are needed to determine the frequency in which individuals spontaneously think 
about task performance during cognitive tasks. The more general thought probes used to 
study mind-wandering may be a suitable approach. 
Although there has been concern that participants’ (particularly older adults’) 
thought reports may not be valid due to participants either being unaware of their mind-
wandering or unwilling to report it, this does not seem to be the case. In one study 
examining mind-wandering and reading comprehension in younger and older adults, 
TUTs were associated with poorer reading comprehension, with no age differences 
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(Frank, Nara, Zavagnin, Touron, & Kane, 2015). Eye-movements were also measured, 
and individuals in both age groups made more regressions and engaged in more blinking 
when reporting TUTs than when they reported being on-task (Frank et al., 2015). These 
eye-tracking results along with the reading comprehension results do not support the 
hypothesis that older adults are unaware of their mind-wandering experiences and 
misclassify TUTs as being on-task. Instead, both older and younger adults seem to be 
aware of and willing to report their mind-wandering experiences. In addition, when 
younger and older adults provide pre-task predictions regarding how much expect to 
mind-wander during the subsequent task, older adults predict that they will spend more 
time off-task than younger adults predict (Frank et al., 2015), even though older adults 
later mind-wander less than younger adults. This suggests that older adults are not 
unwilling to report mind-wandering and it is therefore unlikely that older adults under-
report their mind-wandering experiences due to fear of being stigmatized.  
Research Aims 
The dissertation study attempts to answer some of these questions. In this study, 
thought content probes from the mind-wandering literature were used investigate the 
frequency of metacognitive monitoring in younger and older adults. A primary focus of 
the study is to investigate whether the traditional methods used to measure metacognition 
(e.g. having participants make explicit metacognitive judgments) are reactive in terms of 
whether they alter monitoring frequency in participants who are required to provide these 
judgments. Additionally, the relationship between monitoring accuracy and monitoring 
frequency in both younger and older adults was investigated within the study. This study 
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used a paired associates learning task to better connect to the existing metacognition 
literature. 
Before describing the primary dissertation study, I will discuss a series of initial 
studies. As previously mentioned within the discussion of TRI, the specific content of 
TRI experiences remains unknown and it is unclear whether TRI can be thought of as 
being analogous to metacognitive monitoring. Studies 1 and 3 were designed to gain a 
better understanding of what types of metacognitive thoughts TRI encompasses. Studies 
2 and 4 were also conducted to study the specific content of individuals’ TRI 
experiences. An additional goal of studies 2 and 4 were to determine whether having 
participants complete more detailed thought content probes than those traditionally used 
in mind-wandering studies would lead to reactivity issues and under-reporting or over-
reporting of TRI. Addressing this question allows us to determine which type of thought 
probe is best suited to measuring the amount of metacognitive monitoring individuals 
experience during an ongoing cognitive task. Below, I will discuss the main findings of 
studies 1 through 4, and describe in more detail the thought content probe proposed for 
Study 5.  
Because TRI is typically reported infrequently by younger adults, we used a 
stereotype threat manipulation in studies 1 and 2 to elicit TRI our younger adult sample. 
Because TRI was examined in younger adults under stereotype threat in Studies 1 and 2 
and because the older adult participants used in studies 3 and 4 were not exposed to a 
stereotype threat manipulation, the younger adult studies (1 and 2) and the older adult 
studies (3 and 4) will be discussed separately from each other. Additional figures that 
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show overall TRI, proportions of the different subtypes of approach-based TRI, and 
proportions of the different subtypes of evaluative TRI with younger and older adult data 
plotted on the same figures are presented in Appendices O, P, and Q, respectively.
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CHAPTER II 
YOUNGER ADULT STUDY 1 METHODS 
Study 1 was designed to gain a better understanding of what participants think 
about when they report TRI. The thought probes used in our past studies included two 
categories of TRI: thinking about task strategy or task approach (which we will call 
approach-based TRI) and thinking about task performance (which we call evaluative 
TRI). However, by using more open-ended thought probes, we can garner information 
regarding the specific content of individuals’ mind-wandering experiences. In Study 1, 
we had a small sample of younger adults complete a task containing open-ended thought 
content probes.  
Participants 
Ten female younger adults aged 18-21 (M AGE = 19.10) participated in the study. 
Participants were recruited via the UNCG Psychology SONA system and received course 
credit for their involvement in the study. 
Materials and Procedure 
Again, because TRI is typically reported infrequently by younger adults, we used 
a stereotype threat manipulation to elicit TRI our younger adult sample. To induce 
stereotype threat, we used a procedure previously used by our lab to elevate TRI in  
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female undergraduates (Jordano & Touron, 2017b). After arriving to the lab and 
providing consent, participants completed a few basic demographics questions. 
Participants were told that they were about to complete a task designed to 
measure “quantitative capacity” in order to collect normative data about college students, 
and that this task had revealed gender differences in the past. Additionally, participants 
were tested by a male experimenter and were always tested in a room along with either a 
male participant or a male confederate.  
  Participants completed an automated version of the OSPAN, during which 
participants alternated between verifying mathematical equations and remembering letters 
in serial order. The OSPAN consisted of 81 trials with set size varying between three, four, 
and five math problems to be verified and letters to be recalled. Participants practiced the 
math verification portion of the task, the letter recall portion of the task, and both the math 
verification and letter recall portions together along with an example of the thought probe 
before data collection actually began. During the task, participants received feedback 
regarding their trial-level letter recall accuracy, their trial-level math verification accuracy, 
and their cumulative math verification accuracy.  
Nine thought probes were embedded within the OSPAN task, occurring at 
unpredictable intervals. Probes appeared at various points within an OSPAN trial. Probes 
appeared: (1) after participants saw the final mathematical equation within a trial, but 
before they verified the answer for that equation, (2) after the final mathematical equation 
within a trial had been verified, but before the final letter to be recalled was presented, 
and (3) at the end of a trial after participants saw the final letter to be recalled. Three 
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probes appeared during trials containing set sizes of three, three probes appeared during 
trials containing set sizes of four, and three probes appeared during trials containing set 
sizes of five. These thought probes were entirely open ended and asked participants to  
type in a response to the question, “What were you just thinking about?” A space was 
provided below this prompt for participants to type in their response.  
Participants next completed various post-task questionnaires. These included the 
Thought Content components of the Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (DSSQ; Matthews 
et al., 1999; see Appendix A) which was used as an additional retrospective measure of 
mind-wandering. The DSSQ contains eight questions assessing TRI (e.g., “I thought about 
how I should work more carefully”) and eight questions assessing TUT (e.g., “I thought 
about something that happened to me earlier”). The Motivation component of the DSSQ, 
which contains 15 questions related to motivation level, was used as a measure of 
participant motivation (see Appendix B). Participants also responded to several additional 
Likert-scale questions including questions about perceived task difficulty, task focus, 
fatigue, and stress (see Appendix C for a full list of single-item post-task questions; see 
Appendix D for younger adult Study 1 post-task descriptive statistics). Results for Study 1 
are presented alongside of the results for Study 2 to make it easier to see how probe type 
influences the frequency of TRI and the specific content of participants’ TRI experiences. 
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CHAPTER III 
YOUNGER ADULT STUDY 2 METHODS 
In addition to examining the specific content of individuals’ TRI experiences, a 
goal of the younger adult Study 2 was to determine whether having participants respond 
to more detailed thought probes that include follow-up questions regarding one’s thought 
content would lead to reactivity. If participants must complete additional follow-up 
questions regarding thought content if they indicate experiencing TRI and TUTs, 
participants might be more likely to indicate that they were on-task. To examine this 
issue, younger adults were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. Participants in 
the control condition completed a cognitive task that contained typical thought content 
probes. Participants in the experimental condition completed the same experimental task, 
but responded to thought content probes that branched and asked additional, follow-up 
questions regarding thought content. 
Participants 
Sixty female younger adults aged 18-22 (M AGE = 19.58) participated in the study. 
Participants were recruited via the UNCG Psychology SONA system and received course 
credit for their involvement in the study. Participants were randomly assigned to either a 
standard thought probe condition or a branching thought probe condition. 
 
24 
Materials and Procedure  
Again, we used a stereotype threat manipulation (Jordano & Touron, 2017b) to 
elicit stereotype threat and TRI in our younger adults. The stereotype threat manipulation 
used in Study 2 was identical to the one used in Study 1. Participants completed an 
automated version of the OSPAN. The OSPAN used was the same as the one used in 
Study 1, with the exception of the types of thought probes embedded within. Thought 
probe placement was identical to Study 1. Participants in the standard probe condition 
responded to the standard thought probe that has been used in our past mind-wandering 
studies. Standard probe participants were asked, “What were you just thinking about?” 
and saw a corresponding thought content probe. Figure 1 below shows the different levels 
of thought probes participants could respond to. All participants saw and responded to 
Level 1 (the standard thought probe) and, depending on how they responded to Level 1, 
participants in the branching probe group saw and responded to an additional Level 2 
thought probe. Participants next completed various post-task questionnaires. Participants 
completed all the same post-task measures that were included in Study 1 (see Appendix C 
for a full list of single-item post-task questions; see Appendix E for younger adult Study 
1 post-task descriptive statistics)
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Figure 1. Thought Probe Levels Used in Study 2 and Study 4.  
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CHAPTER IV 
YOUNGER ADULT STUDIES RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Responses to the open-ended thought probes in Study 1 were coded into different 
mind-wandering categories. Responses could be coded as being: on-task, approach-based 
TRI, evaluative TRI, TUTs about everyday things, TUTs about current state, TUTs about 
personal worries, TUTs about daydreams, or other. Open-ended thought probe responses 
were coded into these categories by three independent raters, with near perfect 
agreement. (ICC = .96). There were no open-ended probe responses that did not fit into 
the thought categories listed above.  
Participants in Study 1 reported mean proportions of TRI, approach-based TRI, 
and evaluative TRI that were comparable to what was reported by participants in Study 2 
(see Figure 2). Proportion of approach-based TRI is measured as the amount of reported 
approach-based TRI out of total amount of thought reports. Proportion of evaluative TRI 
is measured as the amount of reported evaluative TRI out of total amount of thought 
reports. For Study 2, we found no effect of thought probe type on mean proportion of 
overall TRI, F (1, 58) = .114, p = .736, indicating that having participants answer 
additional questions about specific TRI content did not lead to reactivity or over or under-
reporting of TRI.  There was no condition x TRI subtype interaction. Participants 
reported similar proportions of approach-based and evaluative-TRI regardless of the type
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of probe they were required to response to. Participants in Study 2 did report more TRI 
approach-based TRI compared to evaluative TRI, F (1, 58) = 6.65, p = .012. 
 
Figure 2. TRI for Studies 1-2. 
 
 
In these studies, we broke approach-based and evaluative TRI into different content 
subcategories. If participants reported engaging in approach-based TRI, they reported 
whether they were thinking about: (1) whether their current strategy was effective (2) 
whether their current strategy was ineffective or (3) a new strategy that could be 
implemented on future OSPAN trials (see Figure 3). Values in Figure 3 reflect the amount 
of each approach-based TRI subcategory as a proportion of the total amount of reported 
approach-based TRI.  
Participants in Study 1 as well as both conditions of Study 2 were more likely to 
have thoughts where they evaluated their current task strategy than they were to think 
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about new strategies that could be used on future trials (see Figure 3). In our original 
conceptualization of these thought types, we labeled approach-based TRI as “proactive 
TRI” because we believed participants might think about strategies they could use on 
future trials to improve task performance. While participants did report thinking about 
task approach or strategy, they were not thinking about specific ways to improve 
performance on the task. Rather, they were evaluating the effectiveness of the strategy 
they were currently using. Evaluating the effectiveness of the task strategy one is 
currently using could be considered a form of metacognitive monitoring rather than an 
example of proactive metacognitive control.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Approach-Based TRI for Studies 1-2. 
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If participants reported engaging in evaluative TRI, they reported whether they 
were thinking about: (1) their current, trial-level task performance (2) their overall task 
performance on the OSPAN (3) their general task ability, or (4) the difficulty of the task 
(see Figure 4). Values in Figure 4 reflect the amount of each evaluative TRI subcategory 
as a proportion of the total amount of reported evaluative TRI. Participants in Study 1 
and within both condition of Study 2 reported thinking about current performance, 
overall performance, and their general ability to do the task well. No participants reported 
thinking specifically about the difficulty of the task (see Figure 3). This pattern may 
provide valuable insight into the impact of stereotype manipulations on thoughts during a 
task, with dispositional rather than situational attributions of performance concerns 
(Schmader, 2010). 
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Figure 4. Evaluative TRI for Studies 1-2. 
 
 
The results of these initial studies suggest that mind-wandering probes do not alter 
underlying cognitive processes. Having participants answer follow-up questions about the 
specific content of their TRI (metacognitive) experiences in Study 2 does not lead to 
underreporting or over-reporting of TRI. Additionally, is seems that participants engage 
in metacognitive monitoring processes when they report approach-based and evaluative 
TRI. When participants reported evaluative TRI, they often thought about their task 
performance and ability to perform the task well. When participants reported approach-
based TRI, they monitored the effectiveness of their current task strategy. Therefore, TRI 
seems to be analogous to metacognitive monitoring, at least in the present OSPAN task. 
Given these findings, mind-wandering thought probes including TRI as a 
response option may be useful in studying the frequency of metacognitive monitoring. 
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Since having participants answer follow-up questions about their TRI experiences does 
not seem to lead to under or over-reporting of TRI, future studies examining monitoring 
frequency could use the more nuanced thought probes developed in Study 2.  
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CHAPTER V 
OLDER ADULT STUDY 1 METHODS 
Using more detailed thought probes than the ones used in previous studies of 
mind-wandering, Studies 1 and 2 provided us a better understanding of what individuals 
think about when they report TRI. When younger adults in Study 1 and Study 2 reported 
TRI, they primarily engaged in monitoring of their task performance as well as 
monitoring of the effectiveness of their task strategies. These younger adult studies 
suggest that TRI is analogous to metacognitive monitoring and, as such, we might be able 
to use online, branching thought probes such as the one used in Study 2 to capture and 
study the frequency of metacognitive monitoring.   Before using this type of thought 
probe to study monitoring frequency in older adults, we will attempt to replicate the 
results of the younger adult Study 1 and Study 2 with an older adult sample.to verify that 
TRI experienced by older adults is analogous to metacognitive monitoring. 
Participants 
Ten older adults (aged 60-75, M AGE = 66.58) participated in the study. 
Participants were recruited from the Adult Cognition Lab database of community older 
adult volunteers. Older adults were paid $10 per hour for participation and participation 
lasted two hours. All participants were screened for near visual acuity of 20/50 or better 
 
33 
and participants with a history of stroke or dementia were excluded from participating in 
the study.    
Materials and Procedure 
After arriving to the lab and providing informed consent, participants completed a 
few basic demographics questions, in addition to measures of near visual acuity, 
perceptual speed and crystallized intelligence. Participants completed the same automated 
version of the OSPAN used in the younger adult studies. As in the younger adult Study 1, 
participants responded to nine, open-ended thought probes embedded within the OSPAN 
task. Responses to these open-ended thought probes were coded into the same mind-
wandering categories that were used in the younger adult Study 1. Participants also 
completed the same post-task questionnaires that were included in the younger adult 
studies.  
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CHAPTER VI 
OLDER ADULT STUDY 2 METHODS 
Participants 
Sixty older adults (aged 60-75, M AGE= 65.97) participated in the study. 
Participants were recruited from the Adult Cognition Lab database of community older 
adult volunteers. Older adults were paid $10 per hour for participation and participation 
lasted two hours. All participants were screened for near visual acuity of 20/50 or better 
and participants with a history of stroke or dementia were excluded from participating in 
the study.    
Materials and Procedure 
After arriving to the lab and providing informed consent, participants completed a 
few basic demographics questions, in addition to measures of near visual acuity, 
perceptual speed and crystallized intelligence. Participants were randomly assigned to 
either the standard thought probe or branching thought probe condition. Participants next 
completed the same automated version of the OSPAN used in the younger adult Study 2. 
Participants completed the same post-task questionnaires used in the younger adult initial 
studies.  
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CHAPTER VII 
OLDER ADULT STUDIES RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Responses to the open-ended thought probes in Study 3 were coded into different 
mind-wandering categories. Responses could be coded as being: on-task, approach-based 
TRI, evaluative TRI, TUTs about everyday things, TUTs about current state, TUTs about 
personal worries, TUTs about daydreams, or other. Open-ended thought probe responses 
were coded into these categories by three independent raters, with near perfect agreement 
(ICC = .97). There were no open-ended probe responses that did not fit into the thought 
categories listed above.  
Participants in older adult Study 3 reported proportions of TRI, approach-based 
TRI, and evaluative TRI that were comparable to what was reported by participants in 
Study 4 (see Figure 5). Across older adult Study 3 and Study 4, we found no effect of 
thought probe type on overall TRI, F (1, 69) = 2.173, p = .122, indicating that having 
participants answer additional questions about specific TRI content did not lead to 
reactivity. Proportion of approach-based TRI was operationalized as the amount of 
reported approach-based TRI out of total amount of thought reports. Proportion of 
evaluative TRI was operationalized as the amount of reported evaluative TRI out of total 
amount of thought reports. Probe type did not affect the proportion of approach-based 
TRI, F (1, 69) = 1.802, p = .173. While, participants in Study 3 did report more
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evaluative TRI than participants in Study 4, this difference in proportion of evaluative 
TRI was not significant, F (1, 69) = 2.860, p = .064. 
 
Figure 5. TRI for Studies 3-4. 
 
 
Values in Figure 6 reflect the amount of each approach-based TRI subcategory as 
a proportion of the total amount of reported approach-based TRI. Again, in previous 
studies within our lab (Jordano & Touron, 2017a; Jordano & Touron, 2017b), we called 
approach-based TRI as “proactive TRI” because we believed participants might think 
about strategies they could use on future trials. While participants did report thinking 
about task approach or strategy, they generally evaluated the effectiveness of their current 
task strategy rather than thinking about new and potentially more effective strategies. 
Evaluating the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of task strategy could be considered a 
form of metacognitive monitoring rather than an example of proactive, metacognitive 
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control. Additionally, older adults in Study 3 reported significantly more TRI about the 
effectiveness of currently used strategies than older adults in Study 4, t (38) = 2.222, p = 
.039, d = .670. 
 
 
Figure 6. Approach-Based TRI for Studies 3-4.  
 
 
If participants reported evaluative TRI, they reported whether they were thinking 
about: (1) their current, trial-level task performance (2) their overall task performance on 
the OSPAN (3) their general task ability, or (4) the difficulty of the task (see Figure 7). 
Values in Figure 7 reflect the amount of each evaluative TRI subcategory as a proportion 
of the total amount of reported evaluative TRI. Unlike the younger adults in Study 1, 
older adults did report thinking specifically about the difficulty of the task. Across the 
two older adult studies there were no significant differences in the amount of reported 
TRI about current performance, task ability, and task difficulty (all p-values > .05 for t-
test focused comparisons). Older adults in Study 4, who responded to a thought probe 
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containing different thought categories that they must choose from, reported significantly 
more TRI regarding their overall task performance than older adults in Study 3, t (38) = 
2.830, p = .009, d = 1.055. This finding suggests that older adults are not as likely to 
reflect upon their global task performance when they are not presented with this thought 
category on a thought probe. It is worth noting that this was not found in younger adults 
(see Figure 3 above). Younger adults were equally as likely to report reflecting on their 
overall performance regardless of whether they saw this thought type option on the probe. 
Additional work is needed to determine why viewing thought probes that explicitly list 
thinking about overall task performance as a thought option alters monitoring in older but 
not younger adults.  
 
 
Figure 7. Evaluative TRI for Studies 3-4. 
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As with the younger adults Study 1 and 2, the results of the older adult Study 3 
and Study 4 suggest that participants engage in monitoring processes when they report 
both evaluative TRI and approach-based TRI. Like younger adults, when older adults 
report approach-based TRI, they report monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of their current strategy. Therefore, TRI seems to be analogous to 
metacognitive monitoring in both younger and older. Given this finding, mind-wandering 
thought probes that include TRI may be useful in studying the frequency of 
metacognitive monitoring in older adults.  
Initially, we believed that if we could replicate the results of younger adult Study 
1 and 2 in an older adult sample, we would use the branching thought probes used in 
Study 2 and Study 4 to investigate monitoring frequency in Study 5. Although type of 
thought probe (open-ended, standard, or branching) did not affect the overall amount of 
TRI reported by older adults, thought probe type did affect reported amount of TRI about 
strategy effectiveness, strategy ineffectiveness, new strategies, current performance, and 
task difficulty. To avoid potential under- or over-reporting of TRI in older adults, and to 
get a better idea of the content of participants’ TRI during the paired associates task used 
in Study 5, we will use open-ended thought probes rather than branching thought probes. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
STUDY 5 METHODS 
As previously indicated, two primary goals of Study 5 are to identify age-related 
patterns in the frequency of metacognitive monitoring, to determine whether making 
monitoring judgments impacts the frequency of monitoring, and to investigate the 
relationship between monitoring frequency and monitoring accuracy. Spontaneous 
thoughts are likely to vary markedly with different kinds of tasks; we were particularly 
interested in looking at these phenomena in the context of a paired associates learning 
task given the ubiquity of these tasks in the metamemory literature. To address these 
questions, younger and older adults completed a task in which they were required to 
study stimuli for a later memory test (the paired associates task). During this task, 
participants answered thought content probes identical to the ones used in Study 1 and 
Study 3 described above and, in one condition, were required to make metacognitive 
judgments regarding their learning of the task stimuli. 
A sample of younger adults and a sample of older adults were randomly assigned 
to one of two conditions. Participants in the probe only (control) condition completed a 
learning task that contained only thought content probes. Participants in the JOL + probe 
(experimental) condition completed the same learning task, but with both thought content 
probes and questions asking participants to make metacognitive judgments embedded 
within. This design allowed us to determine how having participants make explicit 
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metacognitive judgments alters participants’ propensity to monitor the task. Additionally,  
we conducted an age group comparison to determine age-related patterns in monitoring 
frequency.    
Younger and older adults within the JOL + probe condition were also asked to 
provide metacognitive judgments of learning (JOLs) during the learning task. Having 
participants within the JOL + probe group make JOLs in addition to responding to 
thought probes allowed us to measure the association between monitoring frequency (as 
measured by the thought content probes) and monitoring accuracy, which were obtained 
using these participants’ JOLs. 
Participants 
An a priori power analysis in G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2007) 
suggested that a sample of 210 participants (53 participants per age x condition cell) 
should be sufficient to achieve 95% power to detect a medium effect size for a 2 (age: 
young, old) x 2 (condition: probe only, JOL + probe) factorial ANOVA with age and 
condition as between-subject variables. This sample size calculation was conducted using 
the traditional .05 criterion of statistical significance. Given this, we will test a total of 
106 younger adults (aged 18-25) and 106 older adults (aged 60-75).  
One hundred and six younger (aged 18-25, MAGE =19.60 years, SDAGE = 1.14 
years) and 106 older adults (aged 60-75, MAGE = 67.51 years, SDAGE = 3.89years) were 
tested. Younger adults were recruited from the UNCG Psychology SONA system and
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older adults were recruited from the Adult Cognition Lab database of community older 
adult volunteers. Older adults were paid $10 per hour for participation. All participants 
were screened for near visual acuity of 20/50 or better and participants with a history of 
stroke or dementia were excluded from participating in this study.  Older adults (M = 
2.148, SE = .237) reported taking more medications than younger adults (M = .867, SE = 
.184), t (210) = 4.267, p < .001, d = .581. Older adults (M = 23.367, SE = 1.177) also 
scored lower on processing speed than younger adults (M = 35.833, SE = 13.021), t (210) 
= 6.998, p < .001, d = .926. Finally, older adults (M = 23.033, SE = 1.253) had higher 
vocabulary scores than YAs (M = 13.733, SE = .663), t (210) = 6.560, p < .001, d = .893. 
These patterns are all consistent with those typically obtained in cognitive aging research. 
Importantly, there were no condition differences between participant groups in terms of 
age, number of medications, processing speed, and vocabulary (all p-values > .05).   
Materials 
Paired associates learning task. As mentioned within the introduction, the 
paired associates task is commonly used within the study of metacognitive accuracy and 
control (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969; Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; 
Dunlosky & Nelson, 1994). In these past metacognition studies that have used the paired 
associates task, participants are required to provide metacognitive judgments (JOLs) for 
the study items. Because the paired associates task is so commonly used to study 
metamemory, we use it in the current study to investigate whether requiring participants 
make JOLs influences their propensity to engage in monitoring during this task.
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Participants in the current study completed the paired associates learning task 
programmed in E-Prime 2. Participants completed two blocks of the paired associates 
task, with Block 1 and Block 2 each consisting of a study phase followed by a cued recall 
test. The study phases in Block 1 and Block 2 each included a total of 60 word pairs that 
were studied by participants for a later memory test. Prior to completing Block 1 
participants studied and recalled an additional six items that served as practice items.  
The word pairs used included words that varied in their level of intrinsic 
association. Two lists of 60 word pairs were constructed so as to include 20 strongly 
associated, 20 weakly associated, and 20 unrelated pairs. Associative strength is defined 
here as the probability of producing the second word of the word pair as an associate of 
the first word in the word pair (see Koriat, 1981). Strongly associated pairs had 
probabilities of association between .400 and .750, weakly associated pairs had 
probabilities of association no greater than .040, and unrelated pairs had probabilities of 
association of zero (see Castel, McCabe, & Roediger, 2007). All items used in the paired 
associates task were nouns taken from the Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber free 
association norms (2004). Presentation order was randomized during both practice and 
the experimental task, with a one second inter-stimulus interval between the presentations 
of each word pair.
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Each word pair appeared in the center of the computer screen for a total of 10 
seconds. In both the probe only and JOL + probe conditions, thought probes appeared 
approximately every 90 seconds. On probe trials, participants studied the word pair for 
eight seconds before the task was interrupted and the thought probe appeared on the 
computer screen.  Due to the possibility of forced-choice thought probes leading to over 
or under-reporting of TRI, open-ended thought probes identical to the ones used in 
Studies 1 and 3 were used. Participants used their computer keyboard to type in whatever 
they had been thinking about immediately before the thought probe appeared. 
Participants responded to a total of 20 open-ended thought probes. Ten probes appeared 
during the study phase of Block 1 and 10 probes appeared during the study phase of 
Block 2. 
 In the JOL + probe condition, after studying each word pair for eight seconds, 
participants saw a JOL screen. On the JOL screens, the stimulus word of the pair that was 
just studied appeared on the screen (e.g., SUGAR-???) along with the instructions: “How 
confident are you that in about 20 minutes from now you will be able to recall the second 
word of the item when prompted with the first word?” JOL + probe condition participants 
were instructed to type in a percentage from 0% to 100%, indicating the likelihood that 
they will be able to successfully recall the second word in the word pair they just studied 
when cued with the first word (Schraw, 2009).  Participants made their JOLs by typing in 
their chosen percentage. After the JOL has been entered, the next word pair was 
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displayed for study. In the JOL + probe condition, JOL screens did not appear on the 
trials that contained thought probes. Participants in the probe only group were not 
required to make JOL responses on any trials, and the study pair was instead presented 
for the full 10 second duration.  
Paired associates cued recall task. As mentioned above, the paired associates 
task was divided into two blocks, each consisting of a study phase followed by a cued 
recall test. During this test, participants were given the first word of each pair they had 
studied in the preceding study phase and were prompted to type in the second word of the 
pair. The order of item presentation was again randomized.  
Scoring. The thought content probes answered by participants within both 
conditions were used to measure monitoring frequency. Because we believe 
metacognitive monitoring to be analogous to task-related interference (TRI), mean 
proportion of overall TRI served as our measure of monitoring frequency. Relative 
accuracy of JOLs was operationalized as the intraindividual gamma correlation (Nelson, 
1984) between JOLs and recall test performance. Again, these can be interpreted as the 
conditional probability that recall of Item A is greater than that of Item B, given that Item 
A was provided with a higher JOL than Item B was.   
Paired associates strategy reports. Following the recall test in Block 2, the item 
pairs from Block 2 were shown in their original study order, and individuals reported 
which strategy (if any) they used to learn each item. Participants were given brief 
descriptions of different mnemonic strategies so they could provide item-level strategy 
reports (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998; Hertzog, Sinclair, & Dunlosky, 2010). Participants 
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did so by selecting one of six options: 1 – rote repetition, 2 – interactive imagery, 3 – 
sentence generation, 4 – some other strategy, 5 – no strategy, 6 – tried to use a strategy 
but ran out of time.      
Post-task measures. In addition to the various pre-task questionnaires, the 
experimental paired associates task, and the follow-up cued recall test, participants 
completed a few computerized post-task questionnaires. Participants completed single-
item questions about things such as perceived task difficulty, task interest, task 
motivation, and fatigue (see Appendix K). Participants also responded to a brief measure 
of everyday cognitive failures (The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire; Broadbent; 
Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982; Appendix M).  Finally, participants completed a 
brief measure of everyday monitoring experiences (adapted from the Dundee Stress State 
Questionnaire; Matthews et al., 2002; Appendix L), to obtain a rough measure of 
participants’ propensity to engage in metacognitive monitoring outside of the lab.  
Procedures 
All measures were collected during one session. Sessions lasted approximately 
one and one-half hour for younger adults and approximately two hours for older adults. 
The study layout and specific components of the paired associates task (for the JOL + 
probe condition) is presented in Figure 6 below. 
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Figure 8. Layout of Study 5.  
Note. The layout of the overall experiment (TOP) and the Paired Associates (PA) task for the JOL + probe 
condition (BOTTOM). TOP: Dem = demographics, VA = visual acuity, PS = processing speed, Vocab = 
vocabulary, PTQ = single-item questions, EMQ = everyday measure of monitoring, CFQ = cognitive 
failures questionnaire. BOTTOM: For each PA Block in the JOL + probe condition, each of 60 pairs were 
studied for 8 seconds, followed by a 2 second JOL, and then a 1 second ISI. After 10 of the pairs 
(distributed and pseudo-random), a thought probe occurred instead of the JOL screen. Following the study 
phase, participants performed a cued recall task for the 50 pairs that were not followed by thought probes; 
the test for each pair will be followed by a 1 second ISI. Probe only group participants completed the same 
task with the following exception; rather than making JOLs, study instead continued for the full 10 second.
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CHAPTER IX 
STUDY 5 RESULTS 
The following analyses were conducted to address our questions of interest. First, 
we report the results of age (young, old) by condition (probe only, JOL + probe) 
ANOVAs on rates of TRI and recall accuracy. For the JOL + probe condition only, we 
examined age differences in JOLs and relative and absolute metacognitive monitoring 
accuracy. We also conducted age by condition ANOVAs for strategy use, TUT rates, and 
post-task survey responses. Lastly, we examined correlations between monitoring 
frequency and monitoring accuracy. 
Participants completed two blocks of the paired associates task with each block 
consisting of 60 word pairs and 10 thought probes. Participants completed the recall test 
for Block 1 before they began Block 2 of the task. While participants did not receive 
explicit feedback regarding their recall performance it is still possible that completing the 
recall task before Block 2 affected the frequency of metacognitive monitoring, accuracy 
of metacognitive monitoring, and eventual paired associates recall performance for Block 
2. Because of this, we conducted post-hoc analyses examining the effect of paired 
associates task block on our dependent variables. We report the results of age (young, 
old) by condition (probe only, JOL + probe) by block (Block 1, Block 2) mixed 
ANOVAs on rates of TRI and recall accuracy. For the JOL + probe condition only, we 
examined age and block differences in JOLs and relative and absolute metacognitive 
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monitoring accuracy. We also conducted age by condition by block mixed ANOVAs for 
TUT rates. If applicable, main effects were followed-up by pairwise comparisons with 
Bonferroni correction. 
Additional post-hoc analyses were conducted to examine the effect of paired 
associate item relatedness on our dependent variables. We report the results of age 
(young, old) by condition (probe only, JOL + probe) by relatedness (strongly related, 
moderately related, unrelated) mixed ANOVAs on rates of TRI and recall accuracy. For 
the JOL + probe condition only, we examined age and relatedness differences in JOLs 
and relative and absolute metacognitive monitoring accuracy. We also conducted age by 
condition by relatedness ANOVAs for strategy use and TUT rates. Main effects were 
followed-up by pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction. 
Task-Related Interference 
Open-ended thought probe responses were coded into the thought categories by 
three independent raters, with near perfect agreement (ICC = .95). Monitoring frequency 
was measured using the TRI category from the open-ended thought content probes and is 
operationalized as the mean proportion of reported TRI about task-approach and task 
performance. In keeping with previous findings from the mind-wandering literature 
(McVay et al., 2013; Zavagnin et al., 2014; Frank et al., 2015; Jordano & Touron, 
2017a), we anticipated a main effect of age on monitoring frequency.We expected that 
older adults would engage in more monitoring and would thus report a higher proportion 
of TRI than younger adults. As expected, the proportion of TRI was higher for older  
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adults (M =.213, SE = .021) than it was for younger adults (M =.097, SE = .020), F (1, 
215) = 16.664, p < .001, ηp2 = .073). 
We also expected a main effect of condition on monitoring frequency, with both 
younger and older adults in the JOL + probe group reporting more monitoring than 
younger and older adults in the probe only group, due to the presence of the JOL screens. 
Overall, participants in the JOL + probe l condition (M =.219, SE = .020) reported more 
TRI than those in the probe only condition (M = .092, SE = .020), F (1, 215) = 19.700, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .085).  
It was initially hypothesized that these main effects would be qualified by an age 
x condition interaction. We expected that the inclusion of JOL screens in the JOL + probe 
condition would decrease age-related differences in the amount of reported TRI by 
increasing TRI in younger adults who might not engage in monitoring otherwise. An age 
x condition interaction (F (1, 215) = 10.081, p = .002, ηp2 = .045) was found. However, 
younger adults in the JOL + probe l condition (M = .115, SE = .022) did not report 
significantly more TRI than younger adults in the probe only condition (M = .078, SE = 
.017), t (104) = 1.322, p = .189, d = .181. Conversely, older adults in the JOL + probe 
condition (M = .322, SE = .046) reported more TRI than older adults in the probe only 
condition (M = .105, SE = .020), t (104) = 4.334, p < .001, d = .589.  
While responding to JOL screens did not seem to effect younger adults’ 
propensity to engage in metacognitive thinking, the inclusion in JOL screens did increase 
the propensity to engage in metacognitive thinking in older adults, who may already more 
likely to experience concerns regarding cognitive performance (Hertzog & Hultsch, 
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2000). This pattern is interesting, because it indicates that older adults, who are already 
more prone to monitoring, are also more likely to increase monitoring when the task 
encourages these monitoring behaviors. In contrast, task demands have less of an impact 
on monitoring frequency in younger adults. 
We conducted additional post-hoc analyses examining (1) the reliability of our 
TRI measure across the two halves of the paired associates task and (2) the effect of 
block on TRI. Descriptive statistics for proportion of overall TRI broken down by age 
group, condition, and task block are presented in Appendix R. To examine the reliability 
of our TRI measure across Block 1 and Block 2 of the paired associates task we 
calculated split-half reliability of our TRI measure. The Spearman-Brown split-half 
reliability coefficient for overall proportion of reported TRI across the two task blocks 
was .87, indicating adequate reliability of the TRI measure (Hulin, Netemeyer, & 
Cudeck, 2001). There was a significant main effect of block on TRI, F (1, 212) = 32.531, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .133. Participants reported significantly more TRI on Block 1 (M = 
.093,SE = .008) of the PA task than on Block 2 (M = .062, SE = .007) (p-value < .05). 
The block x age, block x condition, and block x age x condition interactions were all non-
significant (all p-values > .05).  
It has been found that task duration affects TRI (Smallwood, Obonsawin, & Reid, 
2002) with participants reporting fewer stimulus-dependent thoughts (on-task thinking 
and task-related interference) and more stimulus-independent thoughts (TUTs) with 
increased task duration. It is possible that both younger and older adults became less  
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focused on the task overtime, reporting fewer on-task thoughts and TRI and more TUTs 
on Block 2 compared to Block 1.  
Descriptive statistics for proportion of overall TRI broken down by age group, 
condition, and paired associates item relatedness are presented in Appendix S. A main 
effect of relatedness was found, F (1, 212) = 26.131, p < .001, ηp2 = .110. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that participants reported significantly more TRI on probes 
immediately following an unrelated word pair (M = .083, SE = .008) compared to probes 
immediately following moderately related (M = .059, SE = .007) or strongly related M = 
.041, SE = .005) word pair (p-value < .05). TRI did not differ for probes that followed 
strongly related word pairs compared to probes that followed moderately related word 
pairs (p-value > .05). There were no significant age x relatedness, condition x relatedness, 
or age x condition x relatedness interactions (all p-values > .05). 
Content of TRI 
As in our past studies, we separated TRI into different sub-types, including 
monitoring of task performance (which we label “evaluative TRI”) and mind-wandering 
about task strategy or task approach (which we label “approach-based TRI”) (see Figure 
8 below). In this study, we have also included a third category of TRI (which we label 
“other TRI”) which includes task-related thoughts that do not fall neatly into the other 
two TRI categories. Examples of “other TRI” that participants reported include 
wondering how long the task will take and wondering when the memory test was going 
to start. 
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Figure 9. TRI for Study 5. 
The different subtypes of approach-based TRI (Figure 9) for younger and older 
adults are shown below. While we expected main effects of age and condition on overall 
proportion of TRI, we did not make specific predictions regarding the effect of age and 
condition on approach-based TRI or the different subtypes of approach-based TRI. There 
was an effect of condition on proportion of approach-based TRI, F (1, 215) = 6.231, p = 
.013, ηp2 = .010. JOL + probe participants (M = .019, SE = .003) reported more 
approach-based TRI than probe only participants (M = .007, SE = .002), (t (210) = 2.579, 
p =.011, d = .453). Having participants respond to JOL screens resulted in them 
experiencing more off-task thoughts about task approach and strategy. 
There was no effect of age on approach-based TRI (F (1, 215) = .774, p = .461, 
ηp2 = .002) and no age x condition interaction (F (1, 215) = .258, p = .773, ηp2 = .001). 
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However, there was an effect of approach-based TRI subtype on proportion of approach-
based TRI reported, (F (1, 215) = 20.610, p < .001, ηp2 = .061). Participants reported 
more TRI about new strategies (M = .130, SE = .021) they could use to complete the task 
than TRI about the effectiveness (M = .016, SE = .007) of their current strategies, t (210) 
= 5.150, p < .001, d = .701. Likewise, participants reported more TRI about new 
strategies (M = .130, SE = .016) they could use to complete the task than TRI about the 
ineffectiveness (M = .032, SE = .011) of their current strategies, t (210) = 4.134, p < .001, 
d = .688. There was no difference in TRI about effective (M = .014, SE = .006) and 
ineffective strategies (M = .030, SE = .010), (t (210) = 1.372, p = .172, d = .082).  
While there were no significant age x TRI subtype (F (1, 215) = .774, p = .461, 
ηp2 = .002) or age x condition x TRI subtype interactions (F (1, 215) = .258, p = .773, 
ηp2 = .001), there was a significant condition x TRI subtype interaction, F (1, 215) = 
6.342, p = .002, ηp2 = .020. Probe only participants (M = .069, SE = .023) reported fewer 
thoughts about adopting new task strategies than JOL + probe participants (M = .185, SE 
= .036), t (210) = 2.682, p =.008, d = .370. Responding to JOL screens seems to prompt 
participants to think about new strategies they could use to successfully complete the 
paired associates task.  
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Figure 10.  Approach-Based TRI for Study 5.  
 
 
The different subtypes of evaluative TRI (Figure 10) for younger and older adults 
are shown below. While we expected main effects of age and condition on overall 
proportion of TRI, we did not make specific predictions regarding the effect of age and 
condition on evaluative TRI. There was an effect of age on proportion of evaluative TRI, 
F (1, 215) = 7.438, p = .007, ηp2 = .009. The proportion of evaluative TRI was 
significantly higher for older adults (M = .196, SE = .026) than it was for younger adults 
(M = .088, SE = .013), t (210) = 3.715, p < .001, d = .506). There was also an effect of 
condition on proportion of evaluative TRI, F (1, 215) = 5.351, p = .021, ηp2 = .006. JOL 
+ probe participants (M = .199, SE = .026) reported more evaluative TRI than probe only 
participants (M = .085, SE = .013), (t (210) = 3.922, p < .001, d = .534). The age x 
condition interaction was not significant (F (1, 215) = .746, p = .389, ηp2 = .004).  
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There was also an effect of evaluative TRI subtype on proportion of evaluative 
TRI reported, (F (1, 215) = 31.098, p < .001, ηp2 = .099). Participants reported more TRI 
about task ability (M = .165, SE = .019) than TRI about their current task performance (M 
= .075, SE = .014), t (210) = 3.813, p < .001, d = .520, or about their overall task 
performance (M = .059, SE = .012), t (210) = 4.717, p < .001, d = .643. Participants also 
reported more TRI about task difficulty (M = .287, SE = .026) than TRI about current 
task performance (M = .156, SE = .015), t (210) = 7.063, p < .001, d = 1.007, overall task 
performance (M = .125, SE = .012), t (210) = 7.962, p < .001, d = 1.084, or task ability 
(M = .165, SE = .019), t (214) = 3.789, p < .001, d = .516. The difference between TRI 
about overall and current task performance was not significant, t (210) = .833, p = .406, d 
= .546. 
While there were no significant age x condition (F (1, 215) = 1.487, p = .223, ηp2 
= .002) or age x condition x TRI subtype interactions (F (1, 215) = .533, p = .660, ηp2 = 
.002), there was a significant age x TRI subtype interaction, F (1, 215) = 3.019, p = .029, 
ηp2 = .011. Older adults (M = .212, SE = .027) reported more TRI about task ability than 
younger adults (M = .118, SE = .026), t (210) = 2.508, p = .013, d = .341. It is possible 
that older adults, who could be coming into the lab with concerns about cognitive decline, 
had more worry-laden thoughts about their cognitive ability than younger adults (Hertzog 
& Hultsch, 2000). 
Older adults (M = .344, SE = .038) also reported more TRI about task difficulty 
than younger adults (M = .230, SE = .034), t (210) = 2.236, p = .026, d = .304. Again, 
concerns about cognitive decline in older adults could have resulted in them reflecting 
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more on the difficulty of the task compared to younger adults. Older and younger adults 
did not differ in their reported TRI about current performance (F (1, 215) = .013, p = 
.909, ηp2 = .000) or overall performance (F (1, 215) = .083, p = .774, ηp2 = .000). 
 
 
Figure 11.  Evaluative TRI for Study 5.  
 
 
Interestingly, the proportion of probe-caught “other TRI” was significantly higher 
for younger adults (M = .091, SE = .018) than it was for older adults (M = .022, SE = 
.019), F (1, 208) = .495, p = .002, ηp2 = .034). Again, off-task thoughts within the “other 
TRI” category generally encompassed thoughts regarding how long the task is and how 
much time the task is taking. There was no main effect of condition on “other TRI”, F (1, 
215) = .467, p = .495, ηp2 = .002). Likewise, there was no age x condition interaction, F 
(1, 208) = .001, p = .978, ηp2 = .000). 
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We conducted post-hoc analyses to examine the effect of block on approach-
based and evaluative TRI. Descriptive statistics for approach-based and evaluative TRI 
broken down by age group, condition, and task block are presented in Appendix R. In 
addition to the finding that both younger and older adults report more TRI during the first 
task block we also found that participants reported more approach-based TRI during 
Block 1 (M = .010, SE = .002) compared to Block 2 (M = .003, SE = .001), F (1, 212) = 
12.944, p < .001, ηp2 = .058. Participants also reported more evaluative TRI during 
Block 1 (M = .083, SE = .008) compared to Block 2 (M = .059, SE = .007), F (1, 212) = 
19.611, p = .001, ηp2 = .085. For both approach-based and evaluative TRI there were no 
block x age, block x condition, or block x age x condition interactions (all p-values > 
.05).  
Descriptive statistics for approach-based and evaluative TRI broken down by age 
group, condition, and paired associates item relatedness are presented in Appendix S. 
There was a main effect of item relatedness of proportion of approach-based TRI, F (1, 
212) = 9.376, p = .002, ηp2 = .042. Pairwise comparisons showed that participants 
reported significantly more approach-based TRI on trials where they had just studied an 
item pair that was unrelated (M = .008, SE = .001) compared to trials where the word 
pairs preceding the probe were moderately related (M = .001, SE = .001) or strongly 
related (M = .003, SE = .001) (p-values < .05). There was no difference between 
moderately related and strongly related words in terms of approach-based TRI (p-value > 
.05). 
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There was also main effect of item relatedness of proportion of evaluative TRI, F 
(1, 212) = 16.846, p < .001, ηp2 = .075. As with approach-based TRI, pairwise 
comparisons showed that participants reported participants reported significantly more 
evaluative TRI on trials where they had just studied an unrelated pair (M = .060, SE = 
.005) compared to probes following moderately related (M = .039, SE = .004) and 
unrelated (M = .060, SE = .005) pairs. There was no difference in evaluative-based TRI 
for moderately related and strongly related trials (p > .05). These differences in overall 
TRI, approach-based TRI, and evaluative TRI as a function of item relatedness are 
perhaps unsurprisingly, as both younger and older adults have been found to report more 
TRI on difficult tasks compared to easier tasks (McVay et al., 2013). Seeing unrelated 
word pairs, which are more difficult to remember, resulted in participants engaging in 
more monitoring.  
Recall Performance 
To examine the effects of condition and age on paired associates recall 
performance, we used a 2 (age: young, old) x 2 (condition: probe only, JOL + probe) 
factorial ANOVA with age and condition as between-subject variables. In keeping with 
previous work (Hertzog, Kidder, Powell-Moman, Dunlosky, 2002; Hertzog, Sinclair, & 
& Dunlosky, 2010) we expected that, in both conditions, younger adults would correctly 
recall more response words than older adults. For recall performance, we did not 
necessarily expect a main effect of condition or an age x condition interaction.  
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Although we expected that participants within our JOL condition would engage in more 
monitoring, increases in monitoring might not result in immediate increases in recall 
performance.  
For paired associates recall performance, older adults (M = .449, SE = .019) had 
significantly lower paired associates recall accuracy than younger adults (M = .537, SE = 
.018), F (1, 215) = 10.376, p = .001, ηp2 = .045), as expected. Contrary to our initial 
hypothesis, there was a main effect of condition on paired associates recall (F (1, 215) = 
9.883, p = .002, ηp2 = .044), with participants in the JOL + probe condition (M = .535, 
SE = .019) had significantly higher paired associates recall accuracy than probe only 
participants (M = .450, SE = .018). This finding is interesting, as other work has found 
that having participants make metacognitive judgements does not result in reactivity in 
terms of paired associates recall performance when the word list used consists of a 
mixture between related and unrelated words (see Double, Birney, & Walker, 2017 for a 
review of this literature).  
While the age x condition interaction did not reach statistical significance (F (1, 
215) = 3.541, p = .061, ηp2 = .015), it appears that making JOLs resulted in greater 
increases in recall performance for younger adults compared to older adults. Younger 
adults in the JOL + probe condition (M = .580, SE = .028) had numerically higher recall 
performance than younger adults in the probe only condition (M = .494, SE = .026). 
Older adults in the JOL + probe condition (M = .495, SE = .028) and older adults in the 
probe only condition (M = .490, SE = .029) had very similar recall performance.  
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To examine the reliability of our paired associates recall measure across Block 1 
and Block 2 of the paired associates task we calculated split-half reliability for recall. The 
Spearman-Brown split-half reliability coefficient for paired associates recall performance 
across the two task blocks was .79, indicating adequate reliability (Hulin, Netemeyer, & 
Cudeck, 2001). As participants completed the Block 1 recall task participants may have 
received implicit feedback regarding the effectiveness of ineffectiveness of their task 
strategies which could have resulted in them using different, more effective strategies 
during Block 2 compared to Block 1. Differences in task strategy across block could 
result in differences in task performance. Descriptive statistics for paired associates recall 
performance broken down by age group, condition, and task block are presented in 
Appendix R. We did not find an effect of block on PA recall performance, F (1, 212) = 
501.293, p = .260, ηp2 = .006. Participants had comparable performance on Block 1 (M = 
.457, SE = .014) and Block 2 (M = .447, SE = .015) of the task. Likewise, the block x age 
and block x age x condition interactions were not significant (p-values > .05). 
Completing a recall task before studying the Block 2 word pairs did not result in 
improved Block 2 performance.  
Descriptive statistics for paired associates recall performance broken down by age 
group, condition, and paired associates item relatedness are presented in Appendix S. 
There was a main effect of item relatedness on recall performance, F (1, 212) = 1.278, p 
= .260, ηp2 = .703. Unsurprisingly, pairwise comparisons showed that participants had 
significantly lower recall for unrelated items (M = .280, SE = .015) compared to 
moderately related (M = .489, SE = .014) and strongly related items  
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(M = .582, SE = .014) (p-values < .05) and that participants also had significantly lower 
recall for moderately related items (M = .489, SE = .014) compared to strongly related 
items (M = .582, SE = .014) (p-value < .05). The age x relatedness, condition x 
relatedness, and age x condition x relatedness interactions were not significant (all p-
values > .05).  
JOLs   
For our JOL + probe condition, we examined age differences in mean levels of 
JOLs, absolute accuracy of JOLs, and relative accuracy of JOLs. A summary of the 
descriptive statistics for these variables are presented Table 1 below. Younger adults (M 
= 54.063, SE = 2.387) and older adults (M = 17.637, SE = 2.400) had similar mean JOLs, 
t (106) = .387, p = .700, d = 113. This is inconsistent to past work that has found that 
younger adults report higher mean JOLs than older adults (Hertzog, Kidder, Powell-
Moman, & Dunlosky, 2002). Post-hoc analyses revealed that participants had higher 
mean JOLs for Block 1 (M = 54.789, SE = 1.877) than Block 2 (M = 51.299, SE = 1.982), 
F (1, 106) = 13.431, p < .001, ηp2 = 112). Participants appeared to have gotten more 
confident in their ability to correctly recall the words as the task went on. We did not find 
a block x age interaction for mean JOLs (p-value > .05).  
There was a main effect of relatedness on participants’ mean JOLs, F (1, 107) = 
125.675, p < .001, ηp2 = .705. Consistent with past work (Hertzog, Kidder, Powell-
Moman, & Dunlosky, 2002), pairwise comparisons showed that participants gave higher 
JOLs to strongly related word pairs (M = .656, SE = .021) compared to moderately 
related (M = .598, SE = .022) and unrelated (M = .319, SE = .020) word pairs. 
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Participants also had significantly higher mean JOLs for moderately related items (M = 
.598, SE = .022) compared to unrelated items (M = .319, SE = .020). We did not find an 
age x relatedness interaction for mean JOLs (p-value > .05). While both younger and 
older adults gave the highest JOLs to strongly related word pairs and the lowest JOLs to 
the unrelated word pairs (see Appendix S), this effect was not greater in older adults. 
Therefore, we did not replicate past work (Hertzog, Kidder, Powell-Moman, & Dunlosky, 
2002) showing that sensitivity to item relatedness was greater for older adults than 
younger adults. 
The simple difference between a participants’ mean JOL and mean recall 
measures their average overconfidence and underconfidence. We expected a possible 
effect of age on the difference scores, with older adults having mean JOLs closer to their 
actual mean recall levels (Hertzog, Kidder, Powell-Moman, & Dunlosky, 2002). While 
older adults did have mean JOLs closer to their actual mean recall, younger (M = .064, 
SE = .025) and older (M = -.014, SE = .025) adults were not significantly different. Both 
younger and older adults were well-calibrated in terms of their JOLs, and had little 
discrepancy between their mean JOLs and mean recall. There was no difference between 
younger and older adults for the simple difference between mean JOL and mean recall, t 
(106) = 1.935, p = .056, d = .425.  
Simple difference scores were similar in Block 1 (M = -.036, SE = -.033) and 
Block 2 (M = .171, SE = .029), F (1, 106) = .039, p = .845, ηp2 = .002). Block was not 
found to interact with age (p-value > .05). There was a main effect if item relatedness on 
participants’ simple difference scores, F (107) = 8.124, p = .001, ηp2 = .134. Participants 
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had smaller difference scores for strongly related items (M = -.003, SE = .024) compared 
to moderately related items (M = -.054, SE = .023), indicating that participants were more 
accurate in monitoring their performance when the word pairs were more strongly 
related. The age x relatedness interaction was not reliable (p-values > .05), in keeping 
with past work that has looked at the effect of item relatedness on JOL simple difference 
scores.    
The absolute difference or discrepancy between mean JOL and recall (regardless 
of whether the JOLs underestimate or overestimate recall) is a measure of absolute 
metacognitive accuracy used within the metacognition literature (Devolder et al., 1990). 
We expected smaller absolute difference scores than younger adults (Hertzog, Kidder, 
Powell-Moman, & Dunlosky, 2002) compared to older adults. However, younger (M = 
.162, SE = .015) and older adults (M = .199, SE = .016) had comparable absolute 
difference scores, t (102) = 1.671, p = .098, d = .324. Participants had similar absolute 
difference scores for Block 1 (M = .172, SE = .012) and Block 2 (M = .189, SE = .017), F 
(1, 106) = .229, p = .633, ηp2 = .002). The age x block interaction was not reliable (p-
value > .05). In keeping with past work, the main effect of relatedness and the age x 
relatedness interaction on absolute difference scores were not significant (both p-values > 
.05). 
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Table 1 
 
Monitoring Indices Descriptive Statistics  
 YA Probe Only OA Probe Only p-value 
N 53 53  
 M SE M SE  
Mean JOLs 
JOL Simple Diff 
JOL Absolute Diff  
54.063 
.064 
.162 
2.387 
.024 
.015 
52.083 
-.014 
.199 
2.400 
   .025 
.016 
.049 
.056 
.098 
Gamma  .273 .022 .241 .023 322 
 
Note. Only experimental participants were required to make JOLs in addition to 
responding to thought content probes. 
 
We were also able to examine the effects of age on JOL resolution within our JOL 
+ probe condition. Because it is one of the most widely used measures of metacognitive 
accuracy within the memory literature, relative accuracy of JOLs was operationalized in 
this study as the gamma correlations (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954; Nelson, 1984) between 
JOLs and recall test performance. Computing gamma correlations will allow us to 
compare the results of this study to other studies within the metacognition literature. 
Because extreme marginal values of JOLs or recall can distort measures of metacognitive 
accuracy, participants who recalled less than 5% correct or greater than 95% correct of 
the items were excluded from our analyses, as such, two younger adults were excluded 
from the following analyses. No participants needed to be dropped due to having 
insufficient variability in their JOL responses. Given previous research, we did not expect 
an effect of age on JOL resolution (Hertzog, Sinclair, & Dunlosky, 2010). As expected, 
the gamma correlations for younger adults within the JOL + probe condition (M = .273, 
SE = .022) and older adults within the JOL + probe condition (M = .241, SE = .023) did 
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not differ (t (102) = .995, p = .322, d = .193. Older adults were as accurate as younger 
adults in estimating their likelihood of recalling the paired associates task stimuli.  
Participants had similar gamma coefficients for Block 1 (M = .261, SE = .021) 
and Block 2 (M = .253, SE = .018), F (1, 567) = .163, p = .687, ηp2 = .002). The block x 
age interaction was not significant (p-value > .05). The main effect of relatedness and age 
x relatedness interaction were both non-significant (both p-values > .05). JOL resolution 
did not change throughout the task and did not differ according to item difficulty. This 
finding is consistent with other work that has shown that relatedness does not effect 
relative accuracy in younger and older adults (Hertzog, Kidder, Powell-Moman, & 
Dunlosky, 2002).  
Within the JOL + probe condition, we conducted exploratory analyses to measure 
the association between monitoring frequency and monitoring accuracy by measuring the 
correlation between proportion of TRI and gamma correlations. An a priori power 
analysis in G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2007) suggested that a total 
sample of 106 participants (53 participants in each age group within the JOL + probe 
condition) should be sufficient to achieve 89% power to detect a medium effect size 
when looking at the correlation between TRI frequency and JOL resolution. This sample 
size calculation was conducted using the traditional .05 criterion of statistical 
significance. Correlations between our various monitoring indices (gamma, mean JOL, 
and absolute difference between recall performance and JOLs), TRI, use of effective 
recall strategies, and PA task recall performance are presented in Table 2 below. 
Correlations between the monitoring indices, TRI, use of effective recall strategies, and 
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PA task recall performance within the younger adult sample and the older adult sample 
are presented in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively.   
We expected that, both overall and within each age group within the JOL + probe 
condition, proportion of TRI would be positively associated with the gamma correlations, 
indicating that those who monitor performance more frequently will also monitor with 
greater accuracy. We also expected a negative association between proportion of TRI and 
absolute difference scores between mean JOLs and mean recall performance, indicating 
that those who monitor performance more frequently also are better able to predict their 
eventual recall performance. Contrary to our predictions, gamma correlations was not 
correlated with TRI1 (r = -.064, p = .508), JOL difference scores (r = -.011, p = .914), or 
absolute differences scores (r = .011, p = .914).  Within the younger adult sample and 
within the older adult sample, gamma correlations, JOL difference scores, and JOL 
absolute difference scores likewise were not associated with TRI (all p-values > .05).  
Our measures of metacognitive monitoring accuracy were not associated with evaluative 
TRI and approach-based TRI (all p-values > .05). Individuals who reported more frequent  
monitoring did not monitor more accurately than those who reported less frequent 
monitoring.  
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Table 2 
 
Overall Correlations Between Monitoring Indices, TRI, PA Recall, and PA Strategy Use 
 
 PA 
Recal
l 
Overal
l TRI 
Approach
-based 
TRI 
Evaluativ
e TRI 
JO
L 
Abs 
Diff 
Gamm
a 
Effectiv
e Strat  
PA  
Recall 
 
1 
 
 
-.064 
 
.005 
 
-.068 
 
.041 
 
.226* 
 
.306** 
Overall 
TRI 
  
1 
 
 
.294** 
 
.988** 
 
.011 
 
-.064 
 
.076 
Approach
-Based 
TRI 
   
1 
 
.142* 
 
.069 
 
-.088 
 
-.083 
Evaluative 
TRI 
    
1 
 
070 
 
-.052 
 
.059 
JOL Abs 
Diff 
     
1 
 
.003 
 
.137 
Gamma       
1 
 
-.056 
Effective 
Strategy 
      
 
 
1 
Note. Effective Strat refers to use of use of effective mediator-based strategies during 
Block 2 of the PA task; * = p < .05 and ** = p < .01. 
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Table 3 
 
Correlations Between Monitoring Indices, TRI, PA Recall, and Strategy Use for YAs 
 
 PA 
Recal
l 
Overal
l TRI 
Approach
-based 
TRI 
Evaluativ
e TRI 
JO
L 
Abs 
Diff 
Gamm
a 
Effectiv
e Strat  
PA  
Recall 
 
1 
 
 
.008 
 
 
.027 
 
 
.004 
 
 
.042 
 
 
.307* 
 
 
.378** 
 
Overall 
TRI 
  
1 
 
 
.399** 
 
.987** 
 
.163 
 
-.130 
 
 
.061 
Approach
-Based 
TRI 
   
1 
 
.248* 
 
.181 
 
-.161 
 
-.032 
Evaluative 
TRI 
    
1 
 
.141 
 
-.108 
 
.070 
JOL Abs 
Diff 
     
1 
 
.198 
 
.208 
Gamma       
1 
 
.054 
Effective 
Strategy 
      
 
 
1 
Note. Effective Strat refers to use of use of effective mediator-based strategies during 
Block 2 of the PA task; * = p < .05 and ** = p < .01. 
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Table 4 
 
Correlations Between Monitoring Indices, TRI, PA Recall, and PA Strategy Use for OAs  
 
 PA 
Recal
l 
Overal
l TRI 
Approach
-based 
TRI 
Evaluativ
e TRI 
JO
L 
Abs 
Diff 
Gamm
a 
Effectiv
e Strat  
PA  
Recall 
 
1 
 
 
-.078 
 
 
.015 
 
 
-.083 
 
 
.113 
 
 
.120 
 
 
.217* 
 
Overall 
TRI 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
.241* 
 
.986** 
 
.022 
 
.011 
 
 
-.330** 
Approach
-Based 
TRI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
.084 
 
-
.070 
 
-.038 
 
.001 
Evaluative 
TRI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
.036 
 
.018 
 
.120 
JOL Abs 
Diff 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
-.160 
 
.081 
Gamma  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
-.165 
Effective 
Strat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Note. Effective Strat refers to use of use of effective mediator-based strategies during 
Block 2 of the PA task; * = p < .05 and ** = p < .01. 
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Strategy Use  
As mentioned earlier, participants in both conditions completed strategy reports 
following the Block 2 recall portion of the paired associates task. We analyzed the effect 
of strategy use by aggregating the likelihood of participants using an effective mediator-
based strategy (imagery use and sentence generation; see Hertzog et al., 2009) into a 
single variable and calculating the proportion of recall trials where an effective strategy 
was endorsed. Replicating previous work, we expected a significant effect of age on 
strategy use, with older adults using effective strategies less often than younger adults.  
We found that younger (M = .578, SE = .023) and older adults (M = .544, SE = 
.021) reported similar use of effective strategies, (F (1, 215) = 1.385, p = .241, ηp2 = 
.006). This lack of age difference in use of effective strategies is surprising, but might 
account for why older adults performed nearly as well on the recall portion of the paired 
associates task as younger adults. There were no condition differences (F (1, 215) = .086, 
p = .770, ηp2 = .000) in use of effective learning strategies, and there was not an age x 
condition interaction (F (1, 215) = .368, p = .545, ηp2 = .002). 
We initially believed it possible that individuals who engage in more 
metacognitive monitoring and who report more TRI would also generate more effective 
strategies during the paired associates tasks than individuals who engage in less frequent 
metacognitive monitoring. We found that, overall, frequency of monitoring (TRI) and 
efficient strategy use on Block 2 of the paired associates task were not significantly 
correlated with each other (r = .076, p = .275). Within both the younger adult (r = .059, p 
= .182) and older adult samples (r = .061, p = .546), TRI and efficient strategy use 
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remained uncorrelated. Likewise, frequency of approach-based TRI was not significantly 
correlated with efficient strategy use (r = -.083, p = .348).  
Post-hoc analyses revealed a main effect of item relatedness on use of effective 
memory strategies, F (1, 212) = 110.780, p < .001, ηp2 = .343). Pairwise comparisons 
showed that participants endorsed using effective strategies more often when the to-be-
remembered items were strongly related (M = .586, SE = .008) compared to when they 
were moderately related (M = .563, SE = .007) or unrelated (M = .473, SE = .010). This 
likely explains why participants had the highest recall performance for strongly related 
items. We did not find age x relatedness, condition x relatedness, or age x condition x 
relatedness interactions for use of effective strategies (p-value > .05).  
Post-Task Questionnaires  
As mentioned, we administered a variety of post-task questionnaires following 
completion of the paired associates task, including several single-item Likert scale 
questions assessing perceived stress, fatigue, distractibility, motivation, interest, and 
difficulty during the paired associates task. Means and standard errors for post-task 
questionnaires are presented in Table 5 below. adults (M = 3.300, SE = .115) reported 
feeling more fatigue during the paired associates task than did older adults (M = 2.375, 
SE = .117), (F (1, 215) = 31.043, p < .001, ηp2 = .129). There was no effect of condition 
on self-reported fatigue, and no age x condition interaction (all p-values > .05).  
There was also an effect of age on task interest, with older adults (M = 2.907, SE 
= .107) reporting that they found the paired associates task to be more interesting than did 
younger adults (M = 1.870, SE = .104), (F (1, 215) = 47.258, p < .001, ηp2 = .184). This 
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is typical, with older adults reporting increased task interest relative to younger adults on 
a variety of cognitive tasks (Jackson & Balota, 2012; Krawietz, Tamplin, & Radvansky, 
2012; Frank et al., 2015; Jordano & Touron, 2017a) in There was no main effect of 
condition on self-reported task interest, and no age x condition interaction (p-values > 
.05).  
Finally, there was an effect of age on self-rated distractibility during the paired 
associates task, with younger adults (M = 3.115, SE = .107) reporting that they got 
distracted more easily than did older adults (M = 1.804, SE = .112), (F (1, 215) = 69.537, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .184). There was also main effect of condition on self-reported 
distractibility, with those in the probe only condition (M = 2.634, SE = .109) reporting 
more distractibility than those in the JOL + probe condition (M = 2.634, SE = .111), (F 
(1, 215) = 4.915, p = .028, ηp2 = .249). The age x condition interaction was also 
significant, (F (1, 215) = 5.347, p = .022). Younger adults in the probe only condition (M 
= 3.472, SE = .165) had higher perceived distractibility than younger adults that had to 
respond to JOL screens (M = 2.759, SE = .201), t (104) = 2.731, p = .007, d = .373. Older 
adults in the probe only condition (M = 1.796, SE = .133) did not have higher perceived 
distractibility than older adults that had to respond to JOL screens (M = 1.811, SE = 
.114), t (104) = .085, p = .932, d = .012. 
Finally, we administered a modified version of the Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire (CFQ) as a measure of everyday monitoring failures. Past studies using the 
CFQ have found evidence of underreporting of memory errors in older adults, with older 
adults reporting a similar overall number of everyday memory failures as younger adults 
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(Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, Logan, & Strayer. 1994; Reese & Cherry, 2006) or older 
adults reporting fewer everyday memory errors than younger adults (Mecacci & Righi, 
2006). In the current study, there were age differences in reported everyday memory 
monitoring failures, with older adults (M = 71.252, SE = 1.219) obtaining higher scores 
on the CFQ compared to younger adults (M = 53.760, SE = 1.278), (F (1, 215) = 104.466, 
p = < .001, ηp2 = .332). It has been suggested that age-equivalence and age-related 
declines in CFQ scores could reflect decreased ability of older adults to remember their 
own cognitive failures (de Winter, Dodou, & Hancock, 2015). The fact that older adults 
in the current study reported more everyday cognitive failures may indicate that our older 
sample was able to accurately reflect upon their everyday memory performance and thus 
report more cognitive failures. There was no effect of age, condition, or an age x 
condition interaction on DSSQ scores (all p-values > .05).  
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Table 5 
 
Post-Task Questionnaire Data 
 
 
Note.  Scores on the modified PTQ could range from 8 to 40, with higher scores 
representing more everyday TRI. Scores on the Cognitive Failures Question (CFQ) could 
range from 0 to 100 with higher scores representing more instances of everyday memory 
failures. All responses to the post-task questions above were made on a 1 to 5 Likert 
scale. For PTQ Difficulty, 1 = Not at all difficult and 5 = Very difficult. For PTQ Fatigue, 
1 = Not at all fatiguing and 5 = Very fatiguing. For PTQ Instruction (“To what extent do 
you feel like you understood the task instructions?”), PTQ Motivation, PTQ Stress, PTQ 
Fatigue, PTQ Interest, PTQ Satisfy (“How much are you satisfied in your task 
performance?”), and PTQ Desirability, 1 = Not at all and 5 = Very much. For PTQ Effort 
(“How much effort did you put into this study?”, 1 = Very little effort and 5 = A lot of 
effort. 
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CHAPTER X 
STUDY 5 DISCUSSION 
Research that provides insight into the frequency of spontaneous metacognitive 
monitoring is sparse. Most studies of metacognitive monitoring focus on monitoring 
accuracy and factors that influence monitoring accuracy. Common models and theories of 
metacognition assume that individuals naturally and spontaneously engage in thinking 
about their task performance when they complete various cognitive tasks, but this 
assumption has not been well-tested and it is unknown exactly how frequently people 
engage in thoughts regarding their task performance on both laboratory and everyday 
cognitive tasks. Furthermore, it is possible that having participants make explicit 
metacognitive judgments such as JOLs leads to reactivity. The proposed study 
investigated the frequency of metacognitive monitoring in younger and older adults 
during a commonly-used memory task and investigated the effect that making JOLs has 
on participants’ monitoring frequency and their eventual task performance and task 
strategies.  
As mentioned within the Introduction, studying metacognition typically requires 
participants to make explicit predictions or judgments about their cognitive abilities. 
While such judgments are necessary to properly study metacognitive accuracy, it is 
possible that individuals participating in metacognition studies engage in monitoring and
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other types of metacognitive thinking to a greater degree because they are being asked by 
the experimenter or task instructions to make performance judgments. Within the 
proposed study, a group of participants who were not asked to provide explicit 
metacognitive judgments (our probe only condition) were compared to a group that 
makes traditional metacognitive judgments (our JOL + probe condition) in terms of 
monitoring accuracy. 
We found that, at least for older adults, requiring participants to make explicit 
judgements of learning results in increased monitoring. While we did not find that 
increased monitoring by older adults who made JOLs resulted in changes in strategy use 
and eventual recall performance, it is possible that requiring older adults to make JOLs 
could lead to changes in study strategies and performance in other types of cognitive 
tasks. Additionally, participants in the JOL + probe condition had significantly higher 
paired associates recall accuracy than participants that were not required to make JOLs, 
despite not reporting increased use of effective study strategies. While the age x condition 
interaction was only trending, the difference in recall performance between participants 
who only responded to thought probes and participants who responded to thought probes 
and provided JOLs was greater in the younger adult sample relative to the older adult 
sample. As such, including instructions or task demands aimed at increasing one’s 
propensity to engage in monitoring may be a way to boost task performance in younger 
adults who may not otherwise engage in monitoring.  
 The current study is also the first known study to examine the impact of making 
metacognitive judgements on paired associate performance in older adults. Providing 
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JOLs resulted in participants reporting more thinking about both task strategy and their 
task performance and the effect of providing JOLs on the frequency of metacognitive 
thinking was greater for older adults than it was for younger adults. Older adults are 
presumably coming into the testing environment with more concerns regarding cognitive 
performance and cognitive decline than younger adults (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2002; 
Jordano & Touron, 2017a), particularly when they know they are about to complete a 
task with a memory component. Requiring older adult participants to provide 
metacognitive judgements during a memory task may further increase worries regarding 
memory ability and memory performance. While we did not assess the emotional valence 
of participants’ metacognitive thoughts in the current study, further work can examine 
whether requiring metacognitive judgements in older adults specifically increases 
negative appraisals of one’s task ability and performance.  
One might expect that participants would report different types of off-task 
thoughts according to the type of task they are performing. Previous studies of mind-
wandering have assessed mind-wandering during reading tasks (Jackson & Balota, 2012; 
McVay & Kane, 2012; Kraweitz, Tamplin, & Radvansky, 2012; Unsworth & McMillan, 
2013; Frank et al., 2015), sustained attention tasks (McVay & Kane, 2009; Jackson & 
Balota, 2012), and span tasks (Jordano & Touron, 2017a, Jordano & Touron, 2017b). The 
current study was the first study to assess mind-wandering during an associative memory 
task. We replicated the common finding that older adults are on task more than younger 
adults and experience more TRI than do younger adults (McVay et al., 2013; Zavagnin et 
al., 2014; Frank et al., 2015; Jordano & Touron, 2017a), and that the TRI reported by 
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younger and older adults encompasses metacognitive thoughts regarding the 
effectiveness of task strategy and one’s task performance (Jordano & Touron, 2017a). 
Likewise, we replicated the typical finding that younger adults experience more TUTs 
relative to older adults (McVay & Kane, 2009; Jackson & Balota, 2012; McVay & Kane, 
2012; McVay et al., 2013; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013; Jordano & Touron, 2017a). 
Given that TRI seems to be analogous to metacognitive monitoring, the results of the 
study suggests that older adults engage in more spontaneous monitoring than younger 
adults during associative memory task, although they do not experience more 
spontaneous off-task thoughts that are unrelated to the current task. Both the frequency of 
metacognitive monitoring and the specific content of individuals’ TRI experiences can 
vary according to characteristics of the ongoing task. Additional work can be done to 
determine how aspects of the task affect participants’ propensity to monitoring. 
Focused studies examining spontaneous monitoring may also be used to further 
investigate the relationship between monitoring frequency and monitoring accuracy. In 
the current study, we replicated previous work demonstrating age invariance in 
monitoring resolution (Hertzog, Kidder, Powell-Moman, & Dunlosky, 2002). We initially 
expected that individuals who more frequently monitor and who therefore have more 
practice monitoring would also monitor more accurately than those who monitor less 
frequently, and that age-related increases in monitoring may explain the aforementioned 
age invariance in monitoring ability. By having participants in one of our conditions 
complete both thought content probes and metacognitive judgments during the same task, 
we were able begin to address this question. Contrary to our hypotheses, both younger 
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and older adults who reported more monitoring during the paired associates task did not 
have greater monitoring accuracy than those who reported less monitoring.  
It is possible that participants that engage in monitoring frequently do not build up 
monitoring expertise and that factors other than monitoring frequency account for older 
adults’ spared metacognitive monitoring. Both younger and older adults can effectively 
use similar encoding cues when making JOLs (Hertzog, Dunlosky, Robinson, & Kidder, 
2003; Robinson, Hertzog, & Dunlosky, 2006). Because older adults are aware of age-
related declines in memory ability, they might strategically modify their attention and 
goal-directed processing in a way that allows them to attend to cues and make accurate 
metacognitive judgments (Castel, McGillivray, & Friedman, 2012; Hertzog & Dunlosky, 
2011). The theory that older adults selectively regulate their limited cognitive resources 
to better attend to task-related cues is in keeping with theories of cognitive aging that are 
used to explain other examples of age-invariance in cognitive performance (theory of 
selective optimization with compensation; Baltes & Baltes, 1990). Additional studies are 
needed to determine why older adults can attend to task-related cues as well as younger 
adults and make metacognitive judgments that are as accurate as those of younger adults.         
The current study has both strengths and limitations. As mentioned, we extended 
work on mind-wandering to a commonly used associative memory task. The results of 
this study provide insight into how frequently individuals mind-wander and what 
individuals mind-wander about during a learning and memory task that allows 
participants to adopt a variety of strategies to complete the task. This study also extended 
work examining reactivity associated with having participants make metacognitive 
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judgements during an ongoing task. Finally, within the current study we begin to address 
questions regarding metacognitive monitoring frequency and the effect of individual 
differences in monitoring frequency on metacognitive accuracy, task strategy, and task 
performance.    
The current study is not without limitations and there are numerous avenues for 
future research. One surprising finding within the current study is that both younger and 
older adults had lower paired associates recall performance than has been found in other 
studies using similar task stimuli (Hertzog, Sinclair, & Dunlosky, 2010; Hertzog, Kidder, 
Powell-Moman, & Dunlosky, 2002), despite both younger and older adults reporting high 
use of effective mnemonic strategies. The paired associates task was longer than ones 
used in these previous studies, but task performance was not lower on Block 2 of the task 
relative to Block 1. Therefore, this lower recall performance does not seem to be due to 
factors such as fatigue associates with task length. We are unsure of why younger and 
older adults had paired associate recall performance that was lower than what has been 
found in other studies, but one possible explanation could be that having participants 
report to online mind-wandering probes altered paired associates processing, decreasing 
task performance. Further work can be done investigating how responding to mind-
wandering thought probes alters task performance.  
An additional limitation of the current study is that we only assessed 
metacognitive monitoring frequency during encoding. As mentioned within the 
Introduction, individuals are believed to engage in monitoring during both encoding and 
retrieval and monitoring accuracy during retrieval can be assessed by having participants 
 
82 
make FOK judgements. It is possible that individuals monitor to a greater or lesser extent, 
or engage in mind-wandering about different things, during the retrieval stages of an 
ongoing task. Additional studies can be completed investigating how frequency of 
monitoring changes across different stages of a memory task and whether or not 
frequency of monitoring is associated with accuracy of other metacognitive judgements, 
such as FOKs and confidence judgements. The frequency of metacognitive monitoring in 
younger and older adults and its relationship to metacognitive accuracy can also be 
assessed during other types of memory tasks (such as those that are recognition rather 
than recall based) and during tasks that do not have a strong memory component.  
In the current study, we operationalized relative metacognitive accuracy as the 
gamma correlation coefficient. While doing so allows us to better compare the results of 
this study to previous work conducted in the metacognition literature, correlational 
measures of metacognitive accuracy such as gamma and phi coefficients are not without 
controversy. For example, gamma correlations can be constrained by metacognitive bias, 
such that gamma correlations for individuals with a liberal response criterion (and higher 
false alarm rates) will show lower relative accuracy regardless of actual metacognitive 
discrimination ability (Masson & Rotello, 2009). Age differences in these biases can 
make it difficult to draw conclusions about age-related changes in metacognitive 
accuracy using gamma. Although there are measures of metacognitive accuracy that are 
more robust to the effects of bias (e.g. d’ and meta-d’; Fleming & Lau, 2014), these 
measures are traditionally computed for recognition memory tasks rather than recall tasks 
such as the one used in the current study.    
 
83 
Finally, an additional potential limitation was the control condition that was used 
in the current study. A goal of the current study was to examine reactivity associated with 
having participants make metacognitive judgements. To accomplish this we compared 
monitoring frequency, monitoring accuracy, and task performance in a group that made 
JOLs and a group that was not required to provide any type of judgement regarding the 
task stimuli. While participants in were equated in how long they viewed and could study 
the paired associates, it is possible that we would have observed a different pattern of 
results had we used a different control condition. One avenue for future research would 
be to include a control condition where participants are still required to provide some 
type of judgement during the paired associates task. For example, we might ask control 
participants to provide judgements regarding the emotional valence of the study items. 
Including a control condition that is still required to provide some type of judgment 
regarding the task stimuli could allow us to determine with greater certainty whether 
increases in monitoring frequency and recall performance within our experimental 
condition were the result of having them provide JOLs. It is possible that participants 
would report more monitoring and obtain higher recall performance even if they provided 
non-metacognitive judgements during the task. 
Older adults often demonstrate spared monitoring ability. In the current study, 
older adults showed comparable JOL resolution to younger adults. Additionally, older 
adults in the current study had paired associates task recall scores that were comparable 
to younger adults and older adults also reported using as many effective strategies to 
learn the word pairs as younger adults did. The results of the study support previous 
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findings that older adults demonstrate spared monitoring ability, although increased 
monitoring frequency does not seem to account for this age-invariance in monitoring 
ability. If age-related increases in propensity to engage in monitoring do not explain age-
invariance in monitoring accuracy, then additional follow up studies are needed to 
determine why and how older adults often monitor as accurately as do younger adults. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1.  Because we would not consider off-task thoughts about length of task to be an 
example of metacognitive monitoring, we have excluded “other” TRI from our 
TRI variable used in these analyses. Thus, the TRI variable included in these 
analyses consisted of approach-based and evaluative TRI. Excluding “other” TRI 
from our TRI variable did not influence the patterns of results obtained.  
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APPENDIX A 
DSSQ (THOUGHT CONTENT) 
This set of questions concerns the kinds of thoughts that go through people's heads at particular 
times, for example while they are doing some task or activity. Below is a list of thoughts, some of 
which you might have had recently. Please indicate roughly how often you had each thought 
while performing the task, by circling a number from the list below. 
  
1= Never 2= Once 3= A few times 4= Often 5= Very often 
 
1. I thought about how I should work more carefully. 1 2 3 4 5  
2. I thought about how much time I had left.  1 2 3 4 5  
3. I thought about how others have done on this task. 1 2 3 4 5  
4. I thought about the difficulty of the problems. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I thought about my level of ability. 1 2 3 4 5  
6. I thought about the purpose of the experiment. 1 2 3 4 5  
7. I thought about how I would feel if I were told how I performed. 1 2 3 4 5  
8. I thought about how often I get confused. 1 2 3 4 5  
9. I thought about members of my family. 1 2 3 4 5  
10. I thought about something that made me feel guilty. 1 2 3 4 5  
11. I thought about personal worries. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. I thought about something that made me feel angry. 1 2 3 4 5  
13. I thought about something that happened earlier today.1 2 3 4 5  
14. I thought about something that happened in the recent past 1 2 3 4 5  
(last few days, but not today).  
15. I thought about something that happened in the distant past 1 2 3 4 5  
16. I thought about something that might happen in the future. 1 2 3 4 5  
 
Scoring: Items 1-18 on this questionnaire are summated to provide a measure of task-related 
interference (TRI). Items 9-16 on this questionnaire are summated to provide a measure of task-
unrelated thinking (TUT).  
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APPENDIX B 
DSSQ (MOTIVATION) 
Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (Motivation) 
 
Please answer some questions about your attitude to the task you are about to do. Rate your 
agreement with the following statements by circling one of the following answers:  
 
Extremely = 4 Very much = 3 Somewhat = 2 A little bit = 1 Not at all = 0  
 
1. The content of the task was interesting 0 1 2 3 4  
2. The only reason to do the task is to get an external reward (e.g. payment) 0 1 2 3 4  
3. I would rather have spent the time doing the task on something else 0 1 2 3 4  
4. I was concerned about not doing as well as I can 0 1 2 3 4  
5. I wanted to perform better than most people do 0 1 2 3 4  
6. I became fed up with the task 0 1 2 3 4  
7. I was eager to do well 0 1 2 3 4  
8. I would be disappointed if I failed to do well on this task 0 1 2 3 4  
9. I was committed to attaining my performance goals0 1 2 3 4  
10. Doing the task was worthwhile 0 1 2 3 4  
11. I found the task boring 0 1 2 3 4  
12. I felt apathetic about my performance 0 1 2 3 4  
13. I wanted to succeed on the task 0 1 2 3 4  
14. The task brought out my competitive drives 0 1 2 3 4  
15. I was motivated to do the task 0 1 2 3 4 
 
Scoring: Items 1-15 assess motivation. Items 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, and 14 are summated to get a 
measure of success motivation, or motivation to excel in task performance. Item number 15 can 
be used to provide an overall level of motivation, if needed. The remainder of the items are 
summated to provide a measure of how interesting participants thought the task was. Items 1 and 
10 are positively scores while items 2, 3, 6, 11, and 12 are reversed scored.  
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APPENDIX C 
STUDIES 1-5 POST-TASK QUESTIONS 
1. If you reported thinking about task approach on the mind-wandering probes, what 
were you thinking about? Please provide an explanation or example below: 
 
2. If you reported thinking about task evaluation on the mind-wandering probes, 
what were you thinking about? Please provide an explanation or example below: 
 
3. If you reported thinking about task approach on the mind-wandering probes, to 
what extent were those thoughts worry-laden? 
 1=Not at all worry-laden and 5=Very worry-laden 
 
4. If you reported thinking about task evaluation on the mind-wandering probes, to 
what extent were those thoughts worry-laden? 
1=Not at all worry-laden and 5=Very worry-laden 
 
5. If you used strategies to remember letters during the task, please provide an 
example of a strategy you used:  
 
6. If you used strategies to verify math problems during the task, please provide an 
example of a strategy you used:  
 
7. Please rate the effectiveness of the strategy you described that helped you to 
remember letters during the task.  
1=Not at all effective and 5=Very effective 
 
 
 
105 
8. Please rate the effectiveness of the strategy you described that helped you to 
verify math problems during the task.  
1=Not at all effective and 5=Very effective 
 
9. How difficult did you find the experimental task overall? 
1=Not at all difficult and 5= Very difficult 
 
10. How difficult did you find the math portion of the experimental task? 
1=Not at all difficult and 5= Very difficult 
 
11. How difficult did you find the letter recall portion of the experimental task? 
1=Not at all difficult and 5= Very difficult 
 
12. How well do you think you did in this study overall? 
1=Very poorly and 5= Very well 
 
13. Does your performance on the experimental task satisfy you? 
1=Not at all and 5= Very much 
 
14. How much effort did you put into this study? 
1=Very little effort and 5= A lot of effort 
 
15. Would you be able to do better in this study if you tried harder? 
1=Very unlikely and 5= Very likely  
 
16. Were you interested in this study? 
1=Not at all interested and 5=Very interested 
 
17. How fatiguing did you find the experimental task overall? 
1=Not at all fatiguing and 5=Very fatiguing 
 
18. Did you feel stress or tension during this study? 
1=Not at all and 5= Very much 
 
 
 
106 
19. Did you have to read instructions on the screen multiple times before you 
understood them? 
1=Never and 5= Always 
 
20. Did you get distracted easily during the study?  
1=Not at all and 5= Very much 
 
21. How focused were you on accurately recalling letters in the correct order during 
the experimental task? 
1=Not at focused and 5= Very focused 
 
22. How focused were you on accurately verifying the math equations during the 
experimental task? 
1=Not at focused and 5= Very focused 
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APPENDIX D 
PTQ DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STUDY 1 
  
 
Measure M SE 
PTQ Experiment Difficulty 3.23 .12 
PTQ Math Difficulty 3.47 .11 
PTQ Letter Recall Difficulty 3.10 .15 
PTQ Well 3.47 .10 
PTQ Satisfy 3.17 .11 
PTQ Motivation 3.60 .12 
PTQ Better 2.70 .13 
PTQ Interest 3.43 .10 
PTQ Fatigue 3.40 .12 
PTQ Stress 3.52 .14 
PTQ Understand 2.60 .14 
PTQ Distract 2.60 .14 
PTQ Letter Focus 3.87 .10 
PTQ Math Focus 3.57 .11 
PTQ Stereotype 3.40 .12 
DSSQ TUT 14.83 .92 
DSSQ TRI 18.97 .92 
PTQ Letter Strategy Effectiveness 4.13 .08 
PTQ Math Strategy Effectiveness 3.87 .13 
PTQ Task evaluation worry 2.62 .10 
PTQ Task approach worry 2.42 .11 
 
Note.  All responses to the post-task questions above were made on a 1 to 5 Likert scale. For PTQ Overall 
Task Difficulty, PTQ Math Difficulty, and PTQ Recall Difficulty 1 = Not at all difficult and 5 = Very 
difficult. For PTQ Task Performance 1 = Very poorly and 5 = Very well. For all remaining questions 1 = 
Not at all and 5 = Very much. For PTQ Letter Strategy Effectiveness and PTQ Math Strategy Effectiveness 
1 = Not at all effective and 5 = Very effective. For PTQ Task evaluation worry and PTQ task approach 
worry 1 = Not at all worry-laden and 5 = Very worry-laden. 
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APPENDIX E  
PTQ DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STUDY 2 
  Non-branching Branching  
Measure M SE M SE p  
PTQ Experiment Difficulty 3.23 .12 3.13 .14 .590 
PTQ Math Difficulty 3.47 .11 2.87 .18 .006 
PTQ Letter Recall Difficulty 3.10 .15 3.37 .17 .238 
PTQ Well 3.47 .10 3.97 .11 .001 
PTQ Satisfy 3.17 .11 2.73 .11 .006 
PTQ Motivation 3.60 .12 4.00 .16 .050 
PTQ Better 2.70 .13 2.80 .13 .589 
PTQ Interest 3.43 .10 3.27 .15 .378 
PTQ Fatigue 3.40 .12 3.67 .11 .103 
PTQ Stress 3.52 .14 3.80 .17 .209 
PTQ Understand 2.60 .14 3.10 .13 .011 
PTQ Distract 2.60 .13 3.10 .12 .007 
PTQ Letter Focus 3.87 .10 3.63 .12 .130 
PTQ Math Focus 3.57 .11 3.73 .16 .413 
PTQ Stereotype 3.40 .12 3.43 .12 .860 
DSSQ TUT 14.83 .92 15.97 1.01 .407 
DSSQ TRI 18.97 .92 20.30 .86 .295 
PTQ Letter Strategy Effectiveness 4.13 .08 4.17 .10 .756 
PTQ Math Strategy Effectiveness 3.87 .13 3.60 .17 .212 
PTQ Task evaluation worry 2.57 .10 2.60 .12 .848 
PTQ Task approach worry 2.62 .11 2.53 .12 .582 
 
Note.  All responses to the post-task questions above were made on a 1 to 5 Likert scale. For PTQ Overall 
Task Difficulty, PTQ Math Difficulty, and PTQ Recall Difficulty 1 = Not at all difficult and 5 = Very 
difficult. For PTQ Task Performance 1 = Very poorly and 5 = Very well. For all remaining questions 1 = 
Not at all and 5 = Very much. For PTQ Letter Strategy Effectiveness and PTQ Math Strategy Effectiveness 
1 = Not at all effective and 5 = Very effective. For PTQ Task evaluation worry and PTQ task approach 
worry 1 = Not at all worry-laden and 5 = Very worry-laden. 
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APPENDIX F 
PTQ DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STUDY 3 
  Non-branching Branching  
Measure M SE M SE p  
PTQ Experiment Difficulty 3.23 .12 3.13 .14 .590 
PTQ Math Difficulty 3.47 .11 2.87 .18 .006 
PTQ Letter Recall Difficulty 3.10 .15 3.37 .17 .238 
PTQ Well 3.47 .10 3.97 .11 .001 
PTQ Satisfy 3.17 .11 2.73 .11 .006 
PTQ Motivation 3.60 .12 4.00 .16 .050 
PTQ Better 2.70 .13 2.80 .13 .589 
PTQ Interest 3.43 .10 3.27 .15 .378 
PTQ Fatigue 3.40 .12 3.67 .11 .103 
PTQ Stress 3.52 .14 3.80 .17 .209 
PTQ Understand 2.60 .14 3.10 .13 .011 
PTQ Distract 2.60 .13 3.10 .12 .007 
PTQ Letter Focus 3.87 .10 3.63 .12 .130 
PTQ Math Focus 3.57 .11 3.73 .16 .413 
PTQ Stereotype 3.40 .12 3.43 .12 .860 
DSSQ TUT 14.83 .92 15.97 1.01 .407 
DSSQ TRI 18.97 .92 20.30 .86 .295 
PTQ Letter Strategy 
Effectiveness 
4.13 .08 4.17 .10 .756 
PTQ Math Strategy 
Effectiveness 
3.87 .13 3.60 .17 .212 
PTQ Task evaluation worry 2.57 .10 2.60 .12 .848 
PTQ Task approach worry 2.62 .11 2.53 .12 .582 
 
Note.  All responses to the post-task questions above were made on a 1 to 5 Likert scale. For PTQ Overall 
Task Difficulty, PTQ Math Difficulty, and PTQ Recall Difficulty 1 = Not at all difficult and 5 = Very 
difficult. For PTQ Task Performance 1 = Very poorly and 5 = Very well. For all remaining questions 1 = 
Not at all and 5 = Very much. For PTQ Letter Strategy Effectiveness and PTQ Math Strategy Effectiveness 
1 = Not at all effective and 5 = Very effective. For PTQ Task evaluation worry and PTQ task approach 
worry 1 = Not at all worry-laden and 5 = Very worry-laden. 
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APPENDIX G 
DEMOGRAPHICS AND HEALTH QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Participant Information Survey 
 
 
In order to better understand the results of the study you have agreed to participate in, 
we need to know a few things about you and your background.  
We will use this information for research purposes only, and it will be kept strictly 
confidential. You will note that we do not ask for your name during this survey.   
Please respond to the following questions completely. Ask the Experimenter if you need 
assistance in answering any question. 
If you have limited experience with computers, or are unsure about how to use the 
computer in answering these questions, please ask the Experimenter for assistance at any 
time. 
Please press ENTER to begin. 
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1.My sex is (please circle):MaleFemale 
2.My birth date is:   
 
            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       (Month)   (Day)(Year) 
3. What is your native language? 
 
English:   _____Other (please specify):  ________________ 
4.What is your ethnic background? Please check the appropriate alternative. 
 _____First Nations origin (A person having origins in any of the original peoples 
of North America, and who maintains a cultural identification through tribal or 
band affiliation or community recognition) 
 _____Asian or Pacific Islander (A person having origins in any of the original 
peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, or the Pacific 
Islands.  This area includes, for example, China, India, Pakistan, Japan, Korea, the 
Philippine Islands, and Samoa.) 
 _____Black, not of Hispanic origin (A person having origins in any of the black 
racial groups of Africa) 
 _____Hispanic (A person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South 
American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race) 
______White, not of Hispanic origin (A person having origins in any of the 
original peoples of Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East) 
5. Which academic diplomas / degrees / certificates have you obtained?  (Please circle ALL that 
apply) 
a)   no degree 
b)   high school diploma 
c)   technical/trade school or community college 
d)   Bachelor’s (e.g., BA, BSc, BComm.) 
e)   Master’s (e.g., MA, MSc, MEd, LLM) 
f)    Law degree (Bachelor=s, LLB) 
g)   Medical degree (MD) 
h)   PhD or other doctoral degree 
i)    other or additional degrees (please specify) 
6. For EACH of the following levels of education, please circle the highest grade or 
years of full-time attendance you have COMPLETED. Do not include part-time or 
extension courses taken for interest. 
a) Grade/Intermediate School 
Grade 1   Grade 2   Grade 3   Grade 4   Grade 5   Grade 6   Grade 7   Grade 8 
b) Secondary/High School 
 
 
none Grade 9   Grade 10   Grade 11   Grade 12   Grade 13 
c) Technical, Trade, Nursing or Business School, or Community College 
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none 1 year   2 years   3 years   4 years   5+ years 
d) University (Bachelor=s Level) 
none 1st year   2nd year   3rd year   4th year   5th year 
e) Post-Graduate School (e.g., Master's, PhD) 
none 1 year   2 years   3 years   4 years   5+ years 
7.Are you currently involved in volunteer work?  Yes _____No _____ 
If yes, please briefly describe your volunteer activities: 
________________________________________________________________________
__ 
8.          Are you currently a student?   Yes _____ No _____ 
 If yes, how many hours a week do you spend in classes? _______ hrs  
 Are you pursuing a specific certificate, diploma or degree? Yes _____  No _____  
 Please briefly describe what you are studying: 
 ________________________________________________________________________
__ 
9. Compared to a perfect state of health, I believe my overall health to be (Please circle 
one): 
 a. very good 
 b. good 
 c. fair 
 d. poor 
 e. very poor 
10. Compared to other people my age, I believe my overall health to be (Please circle one): 
 a. very good 
 b. good 
 c. fair 
d. poor 
e. very poor 
 
11. Compared to other people my age, I believe my eyesight to be (Please circle one): 
 a. very good 
 b. good 
 c. fair 
 d. poor 
 e. very poor 
 
12. Compared to other people my age, I believe my hearing to be (Please circle one): 
 a. very good 
 b. good 
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 c. fair 
 d. poor 
 e. very poor 
 
13. In the past 3 years, my health has affected my daily activities in the following way 
(Please circle one): 
 a.  not applicable 
 b.  improved 
 c.  no change 
d. slightly reduced 
e. moderately reduced 
f. drastically reduced 
g. gave up employment 
h. gave up travel 
14. The following chart lists a number of health-related conditions that may apply to you.  
Please answer all parts of each question as concisely as you can.  The first part of each 
question is the most important for you to answer.  Specifically, we would like to know 
whether or not you have ever been diagnosed by a medical practitioner with the 
condition in question.  If you responded YES, please complete the remaining parts of 
the question. 
 
 
 
Do you suffer from this 
condition? 
If YES, how serious is your condition? (please check one) At 
what 
AGE 
were 
you 
diagn
osed 
with 
this 
condit
ion? 
 
No 
 
Yes, not 
serious 
Yes, 
moderately 
serious 
 
Yes, very 
serious 
Hearing problems (e.g., tinitus) 
that cannot be corrected with a 
hearing aid 
     
Visual disorders (e.g., glaucoma, 
cataracts, macular degeneration) 
that cannot be corrected with 
glasses 
     
Asthma      
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Bronchitis      
Tuberculosis      
Hardening of the arteries      
High blood pressure      
Stroke      
Low blood pressure      
Gall bladder problems      
Liver trouble      
Stomach ulcer      
Kidney or bladder trouble or 
cystitis 
     
Gynecological problems      
Colitis or diverticulitis      
Paralysis not related to stroke      
Spinal condition (e.g., scoliosis)      
Back trouble      
Parkinson’s disease      
Epilepsy      
Thyroid      
Prostate problems      
Anemia      
Depression      
Alcohol dependence      
Drug dependence      
Heart trouble      
Osteo-arthritis      
Rheumatoid arthritis      
Osteoporosis      
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Diabetes (sugar sickness)      
Cancer      
Migraine      
Encephalitis      
Meningitis      
Head injury      
 
15. Are you presently taking any drugs or medications (prescription or other)? 
 
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
If yes, here is a chart of medications that people often have to take.  Please indicate whether 
you are taking any of these medications  (Check all that apply). 
 medicine for high blood pressure (e.g., Prinivil, Lopressor, Procardia, Vasotec, etc.) 
 digitalis or other medication for your heart 
 medicine for chest pain/angina (e.g., Nitroglycerine, Digoxin, Procardia, etc.) 
 any sort of diabetes medicine (pills, pumps, or injections: e.g., Glucotrol, Tolinase, 
Insulin) 
 cortisone or anti-inflammatory drugs for arthritis (e.g., Prednisone, Tolectin, etc.) 
 pills to make you lose water or salt (diuretics: e.g., Lasix, Bumex, etc.) 
 tranquillizers or sedatives (e.g., Ativan, Xanax, Valium, etc.) 
 sleeping pills/hypnotics (e.g., Chloral hydrate, Restoril, Dalmane, etc.) 
 blood thinner medicine (anticoagulants: e.g., Coumadin, Heparin, etc.) 
 vitamin or mineral supplements (e.g., Iron, Calcium, Potassium, etc.) 
 female hormone supplements (e.g., Estrogen, Premarin, etc.) 
 appetite suppressants or diet pills 
 pain medication (more than 2-3 times a week: e.g., Tylenol, Advil, Percocet, Darvocet-
N-100, etc.) 
 allergy or asthma medicine 
 ulcer or other stomach medicine (e.g., Tagamet, Lactate, Prilosec, etc) 
 antibiotics (e.g., Penicillin, Ampicillin, Tetracycline, etc.) 
 medicine to control seizures (e.g., Dilantin, Tegretol, etc.) 
 medicine to control tremors (e.g., L-dopa, Sinemet, Parlodel, etc.) 
 oral contraceptives 
 stimulants to help you stay awake 
 eye medication (e.g., eye drops/ointments: e.g., IsoptoCarpine, etc.) 
 anti-depressant medication (e.g., Wellbutrin, Elavil, Zoloft, Prozac, etc.) 
 anti-psychotic medication (e.g., Lithium, Prolixin, etc.) 
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 chemotherapy for cancer 
 oral medication for cancer (e.g., Nolvadex, Cytoxan, etc.) 
 medicine for a thyroid condition (e.g., Synthroid, Eltroxin, etc.) 
 other prescription or non-prescription drugs (please indicate) 
  
  
  
  
  
 
16. Today, have you taken any drugs or medications (prescription or other) that tend to 
make you drowsy? 
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
17.  Do you smoke or use tobacco products?  (Please circle one) 
 a. Yes At what age did you start smoking?   __________ 
 b. No, I previously used tobacco but I have quit completely 
  For how many years did you use tobacco?   __________ 
 c. No, I have never used tobacco 
 If you currently use tobacco, what do you use?  (Please circle.  Complete all that apply) 
 a. Cigarettes 
  How many cigarettes do you smoke?  
  __________ cigarettes per __________ (day/week/month/year) 
 b. Cigars 
  How many cigars do you smoke?  
  __________  cigars per __________ (day/week/month/year) 
 c. Pipe 
  How many pipe bowls do you smoke?  
  __________ pipe bowls per __________ (day/week/month/year) 
 d. Snuff or chewing tobacco 
  How many pinches or plugs do you use? 
  __________ pinches/plugs per__________ (day/week/month/year) 
18. Do you drink alcoholic beverages?  (Please circle one) 
a. Yes At what age did you start drinking?   __________ 
 b. No, I used to drink but have now completely given it up 
  For how many years did you drink?   __________ 
c. No, I never drink  
 
If you currently drink alcoholic beverages, what do you drink? (Please circle. Complete 
all that apply) 
 a. Beer 
  How many cans/bottles of beer do you consume? 
  __________ bottles/cans per __________ (day/week/month/year) 
 b. Wine 
  How many glasses of wine do you consume? 
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  __________ glasses per __________ (day/week/month/year) 
 c. Hard liquor (i.e., with no mix added) 
  How many drinks do you consume?  (1 drink = 1 ounce of alcohol) 
  __________ drinks per __________ (day/week/month/year) 
 d. Mixed drinks (i.e., alcohol with mix added) 
  How many mixed drinks do you consume?  (1 drink = 1 ounce of alcohol) 
  __________ mixed drinks per __________ (day/week/month/year) 
 
Thank You for your time
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APPENDIX H 
LIGHTHOUSE NEAR VISUAL ACUITY 
 
 
 
Verbal instructions:   
“This is a near acuity test. Hold this card such that the end of the cord is  
next to your eye and the string is pulled taut. Now read the lowest line of which you can  
easily read all five letters.” 
Scoring:  
If a participant reads a line incorrectly they are instructed to read the line immediately 
above it. This process repeats until the participant in able to correctly read all five letters 
of a line.  Scores are based on the lowest line that participants can read all five letter for. 
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APPENDIX I 
ADVANCED VOCABULARY TEST I-V4 
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APPENDIX J 
PROCESSING SPEED TASK 
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APPENDIX K 
EXAMPLE STIMULI FOR PAIRED ASSOCIATES TASK 
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APPENDIX L 
STUDY 5 POST-TASK QUESTIONS 
1. How difficult did you find the memory task overall? 
1=Not at all difficult and 5= Very difficult 
 
2. How well do you think you did in this study overall? 
1=Very poorly and 5= Very well 
 
3. Does your performance on the memory test satisfy you? 
1=Not at all and 5= Very much 
 
4. How much effort did you put into this study? 
1=Very little effort and 5= A lot of effort 
 
5. How motivated were you to complete the memory test well? 
1=Very unmotivated and 5= Very motivated 
 
6. Were you interested in this study? 
1=Not at all interested and 5=Very interested 
 
7. How fatiguing did you find the experiment overall? 
1=Not at all fatiguing and 5=Very fatiguing 
 
8. Did you feel stress or tension during this study? 
1=Not at all and 5= Very much 
 
9. To what extent do you feel like you understood the task instructions? 
1=Not at all and 5= Very much 
10. Did you get distracted easily during the study?  
1=Not at all and 5= Very much 
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APPENDIX M 
COGNITIVE FAILURES QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
We want to know how often these things have happened to you in the past 6 months.  
Please use the following scale: 
0  
Never 
1  
Very Rarely 
2  
Occasionally 
3  
Quite Often 
4  
Very Often 
 
 
  Rating 
1. Do you read something and find you haven't been thinking 
about it and must read it again? 
  
2. Do you find you forget why you went from one part of the 
house to the other? 
  
3. Do you fail to notice signposts on the road?   
4. Do you find you confuse right and left when giving directions?   
5. Do you bump into people?   
6. Do you find you forget whether you've turned off a light or a 
fire or locked the door? 
  
7. Do you fail to listen to people's names when you are meeting 
them? 
  
8. Do you say something and realize afterwards that it might be 
taken as insulting? 
  
9. Do you fail to hear people speaking to you when you are doing 
something else? 
  
10. Do you lose your temper and regret it?   
11. Do you leave important letters unanswered for days?   
12. Do you find you forget which way to turn on a road you know 
well but rarely use? 
  
13. Do you fail to see what you want in a supermarket (although 
it's there)? 
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14. Do you find yourself suddenly wondering whether you've used 
a word correctly? 
  
15. Do you have trouble making up your mind?   
16. Do you find you forget appointments?   
17. Do you forget where you put something like a newspaper or a 
book? 
  
18. Do you find you accidentally throw away the thing you want 
and keep what you meant to throw away -- as in the example 
of throwing away the matchbox and putting the used match in 
your pocket? 
  
19. Do you daydream when you ought to be listening to 
something? 
  
20. Do you find you forget people's names?   
21. Do you start doing one thing at home and get distracted into 
doing something else (unintentionally)? 
  
22. Do you find you can't quite remember something although it's 
"on the tip of your tongue"? 
  
23. Do you find you forget what you came to the shops to buy?   
24. Do you drop things?   
25. Do you find you can't think of anything to say?  
 
Scoring the Scale 
The CFQ was developed by Broadbent et al. (1982) -- yes, the same Broadbent 
who proposed the filter theory of attention -- to assess the frequency with which 
people experienced cognitive failures, such as absent-mindedness, in everyday 
life -- slips and errors of perception, memory, and motor functioning.  The most 
straightforward way to score the scale is simply to sum up the ratings of the 25 
individual items, yielding a score from 0-100. 
Scores on the scale predict episodes of absent-mindedness in both the 
laboratory and everyday life, including slow performance on focused attention 
tasks, traffic and work accidents, and forgetting to save one's data on the 
computer.   
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A study by Rast et al. (2008) indicates that the CFQ items load on three different 
factors.  Summing scores across the relevant items will yield subscale scores 
representing these dimensions of forgetfulness: 
• Forgetfulness (Items 1, 2, 5, 7, 17, 20, 22, and 23): "a tendency to let go 
from one's mind something known or planned, for example, names, 
intentions, appointments, and words". 
• Distractibility (Items 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 19, 21, and 25): "mainly in social 
situations or interactions with other people such as being absentminded or 
easily disturbed in one's focused attention". 
• False Triggering (Items 2, 3, 5, 6, 12, 18, 23, and 24): "interrupted 
processing of sequences of cognitive and motor actions". 
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APPENDIX N 
MEASURE OF DAILY MEMORY MONITORING 
 
 
This set of questions concerns the kinds of thoughts that go through people's heads at particular 
times, for example while they are doing some task or activity. Below is a list of such thoughts.  
Please indicate roughly how often you have each thought during when you are doing 
different things in your everyday life. 
 
1= Never     2= Once     3= A few times     4= Often     5= Very often 
 
1. I think about how I should work more carefully.1   2   3   4   5 
2. I think about how much time I had left.1   2   3   4   5 
3. I think about how others have done on this task.1   2   3   4   5 
4. I think about the difficulty of the problems. 1   2   3   4   5 
5. I think about my level of ability.1   2   3   4   5 
6. I think about the purpose of the experiment.1   2   3   4   5 
7. I think about how I would feel if I were told how I performed.1   2   3   4   5 
8. I think about how often I get confused. 1   2   3   4   5 
 
This measure was adapted from the ‘Thinking Content’ scale of Sarason et al.'s (1986) Cognitive 
Interference Questionnaire (CIQ). The 8 items from this scale corresponding to task-related 
interference have been included in this measure to provide a rough measure of how much 
participants engage in thoughts related to monitoring in everyday life. Items 1-8 are summated to 
provide a measure of everyday monitoring or TRI. 
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APPENDIX O 
STUDIES 1-4 TRI DATA 
 
 
Figure 12. TRI subtypes as proportion of overall thought reports for the open-ended Study 1 participants, 
the non-branching probe Study 2 condition, and the branching probe Study 2 condition. Bars represent 
standard error for amount of TRI. 
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APPENDIX P 
STUDIES 1-4 APPROACH-BASED TRI DATA 
 
 
Figure 13.  Approach-based TRI subtypes as proportion of overall reported approach-based TRI for the open-
ended Study 1 participants and the branching probe Study 2 condition participants. Participants in the non-
branching probe condition of Study 2 completed standard mind-wandering thought probes and did not answer 
questions about the specific types of approach-based TRI they experienced during the task. Bars represent 
standard errors.  
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APPENDIX Q 
STUDIES 1-4 EVALUATIVE TRI DATA 
 
 
Figure 14. Evaluative TRI subtypes as proportion of overall reported evaluative TRI for the open-ended Study 
1participants and the branching probe Study 2 condition participants. Participants in the non-branching probe 
condition of Study 2 completed standard mind-wandering thought probes and did not answer questions about 
the specific types of evaluative TRI they experienced during the task. Bars represent standard errors. 
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APPENDIX R 
STUDY 5 DESCRIPTIVES BY AGE, CONDITION, AND BLOCK 
 
Note. Only experimental participants were required to make JOLs in addition to responding to thought 
content probes.
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APPENDIX S 
STUDY 5 DESCRIPTIVES BY AGE, CONDITION, AND RELATEDNESS 
 
Note. Only experimental participants were required to make JOLs in addition to responding to thought content probes. 
 
